Did you hear the credit bubble pop last week?
Chuck Ponzi August 28th, 2006
If there was any doubt about the creditworthiness of the housing bubble belief, you need to look no further than the credit expansion that created it. In the end, our housing bubble, like all financial manias of the past, rested on a great willingness expand credit at a rate greater than the growth of the economy.
Our credit bubble likely popped last week.
The growth rate of the economy, that’s like what, 5-6% or so for the past few years?
Well, more or less (although primarily less).
Credit (Monetary) expansion does several things for an economy. The most important is that it allows more dollars (or euros, or whatever) in circulation to buy more stuff. (and stuff is the scientific term for plasmas, Hummers, and granite countertops with obligatory stainless steel appliances). All joking aside, this allows companies to buy more machines to manufacture more stuff, people to buy more houses, and companies to build more buildings to work in. This is generally good for an economy. Imagine an economy with a restricted supply of money that had very little to lend. Banks could not offer reasonable rates on borrowed money due to it being pledged to deposits, jobs could not be created because companies could only buy machinery to be operated in the amount of its earnings, and growth in the economy would be limited in the short run.
So, who controls the amount of money available? Well, the easy answer is… he who prints it!
Of course, it’s not that simple. In fact, if you ask some of the most brilliant people you know, most would not be able to tell you how we create more money in the US.
In the olden days, (when we had a standard set by Gold), money could only be expanded to equal as much as the available gold supply. Each dollar was tied to a specific fraction of an ounce of gold. Ideally, this didn’t change in relation to the amount of gold, so the only way to expand money supply was to mine more of the stuff. This was a barbaric way to live. Mining was a way to grow rich… or so it seemed. The government decided it would rather allow productive enterprise as a means to grow rich, rather than digging stuff out of the ground. So, the dollar was decoupled from gold. (this is intentionally simplified)
It has remained that way in the US since. Gold has gone up and down in relation to the value of the dollar, and the swings have been quite mighty! Still, gold is a “barbarous relic” and its greatest value is that it’s in limited supply. However, many cultures still cling to this funny yellow metal; it’s still used in jewelry, and as a backup currency in times of severe economic uncertainty.
Under the new model, more money could simply be “printed” and a fresh batch of capital could be whipped up in no time flat.
Now, some astute readers may be asking…
What about electronic funds, or money that is deposited? That’s not printed!
Well, that’ s the beauty of the system. Under a standard banking system, banks would be required to hold entire customer deposits, available upon demand to the owner. This is why bank robbing used to be such a great gig… mounds of money sitting in one single place. Now, customer balances are little more than a number on a screen.
Of course, now we have another invention called the Fractional Reserve System. A fractional reserve system means that banks only have to hold a fraction, or a portion of the money, and the remainder can be lent out to businesses or people needing money. This fractional reserve process would allow deposits to be reused, and make them lesser targets for bank robbers… yes, today, robbing a bank might yield only a very, very, very small fraction of their entire deposits. However, that fractional amount still needed to be held as “a reserve” in case depositors required immediate funds.
The “fractional” portion of the banking system allows monetary growth. Fred at Itulip describes it well:
(T)he gist is that banks are required to keep a fraction of their assets on hand, deposited safely at the Fed, to act as a “cash cushion” at times when depositors demand their money from the bank as cash. This cash reserve is in proportion to the amount of depositors’ money that is loaned out. The proportion of this cash reserve to the total amount loaned out is intended to provide just enough of a buffer to keep the bank solvent and keep things running smoothly in the event a lot of depositors make demands for cash at once, such as during a run on the bank. This fraction, called the reserve fraction (or ratio), is typically from 5% to 20% of the amount of money the bank has loaned out. This may seem low, but holding any more cash in reserve than is needed except for outlier cases is considered an uneconomical use of capital by a bank. The cash in reserve is not making money for either the bank or its depositors as loans, so from a day-to-day operations persective, the less reserves the better. From a longer term risk management perspective, the more the better. Statistically, 5% to 20% reserves is the “right” amount, except in those outlier cases where these levels are either too high because reserves at those levels are at some times constraining the economy’s access to credit or, conversely, too low at other times because too many depositors are making a rush to liquidity and demanding their cash.
The reserve fraction, considered as a number that is mutable as a matter of policy, is also one of the most powerful tools a central bank can use to adjust the amount of money available to the economy. It is easy to see why: a reserve requirement of 10% means that banks can lend out ten times the actual money on deposit with the fed. Even a seemingly small change from, say, 2% to 8% means that 12.5 times the money on deposit can be lent out. For example, $10bln initially on deposit with a 10%, reserve requirement results in approximately $100bln of money available as loans. If the reserve fraction is reduced from 10% to 8%, the for the same $10bln cash on deposit there can be approximately $125bln of money available as loans in the economy. This is an increase in the money supply of around 25% from a reduction of the reserve ratio by 2%.
This is where our story gets interesting. If the Federal reserve can increase money so easily as to change reserve requirements, isn’t the flipside to out-of-control increase in monetary supply that reducing money supply in times of inflation as simple as increasing the reserve requirements?
If you guessed yes, you would be right.
So, getting on to the meat of the issue: Would you believe me if I said that an article titled Sub-Prime Lenders’ Shares Fall has nothing to do with the Fractional Lending system, and yet has everything to do with the impending housing bubble bust?
Many, too many if you ask me, have blamed the Federal Reserve for the credit expansion. I only partially agree with that statement. You see, the FED has lost control of the money supply.
Lost control of the very thing they are supposed to control?
Yes, and very badly. The problem arises with the reduction of the fractional reserve to 10%. I recommend reading Fred’s entire treatise (takes about 20 minutes, but is chock full of facts and great figures). For me to write an entire basis for these assumptions would mean I would be recreating his work, which is a great read.
What about lending outside of the “reserve banks”?
Good question! The next pin to be pulled in the financial markets was subprime lending, which has caused some of the worst type of lending. These are some of the bizarre outcomes of expansion of the subprime lending markets:
1. A great deal of subprime is now concentrated in Stated Income Loans (aka liar loans) which have been estimated to contain 60% liars. Question is… if you lie on your application or on your taxes, which one is worse? The answer… does it matter? Lying leads to more lying, which can lead to overstretching financially and failure when difficulties arise.
2. The greatly expanded access to credit allowed borrowers with a diminished ability to pay and questionable personal financial responsibility. This is evidenced by the increasing number of “never-paid a single payment” loans being floated. So much that investors have balked and required these bad dealers to repurchase their own junk.
3. Other banks that needed to compete, needed to lower their lending standards. This introduced more systemic risk into our banking system.
4. Expanded credit markets depressed risk premiums overall, and “chasing returns” meant a flight to risk, in the form of subprime lending.
So, what caused the shift to subprime lending? Would it surprise you if I told you the FED did it to themselves?
By lowering the cost of money, creditworthy people could borrow money and lend it to other at a higher rate. This is nothing new, it’s called rate arbitrage, and is practiced all over the world; between countries, and in subprime lending.
In addition, pension funds and insurance companies based future values of their portfolios on a certain return rate. To accept the abysmal rate that the FED was offering would have mean big losses or underfunded liabilities. What do you really think caused the big pension funds to fail? Hint: It wasn’t that companies didn’t put enough into them, it was that the returns failed to match historical returns, and defined benefit (as opposed to defined contribution plans) require that the company come up with the shortfall. In a higher-rate, higher-return environment, we likely wouldn’t have heard a peep out of defined-benefit pension funds.
Essentially, because interest rates went down with restricted reserve requirements and expanded competition, banks could only take on more and more risk to preserve their income. The easy solution? Sell the risk to someone else through MBS (Mortgage Backed Security) agreements! Yes, through this handy-dandy little feature, banks and loan brokers can just make money on the transaction and take none of the risk to the toxic loan you just made. Because investors had not yet figured out just how much risk there is in those loans, rates remained low, creating very low risk premiums.
Which brings us back to Greenspan’s words a little over a year ago:
Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that supported higher asset prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low-risk premiums.
Cryptic? Yes. Prescient? Yes.
But, these are the words of a desperate man, not of an in-control central banker who wields magnificent financial power. He is in one sentence lamenting his loss of control over the credit environment, and warning of risk in the system. However, he feels there is nothing that he can do at this time. Raising interest rates creates an inverted yield curve, and the FED can no longer push the yield curve in any direction. Raising reserve requirements only puts banks at a disadvantage. It seems, investors have an insatiable desire for more risk because HE put them there. The fabled “Greenspan Put” is exactly that; a fable. He would be pushing on a string to try to solve any problems at this point.
I think we just heard the pop last week that makes this house of cards come down.

