|  home  |   My Profile  |   The Forum

Archive for November, 2006

What is A Bubble?

Chuck Ponzi November 27th, 2006

For at least a year, I have wanted to define a bubble for readers of this blog. The term is quite often misused, and like a disease is better defined by its symptoms. No, this is not a definitive work… I am sure there will be many who come after me who will be able to add information to the definition and description financial bubble or financial mania. Rather, this is an attempt to bring together the most important aspects of a financial bubble for those who are not widely read and do not have vast investing experience.

This is not intended to prove that there is a bubble… there will be plenty of time to prove that. Especially since it is often difficult for the casual observer to detect a bubble except for after one has burst. This is just to define and describe what a housing or investing bubble is and would look like. There have been both bubbles in the past, and considering the reign of loose monetary policy of the past 10 years, it seems very likely we will have even more in the future.

When defining a bubble, it is valuable to consider some of the attributes of an actual air bubble. Get out the kids’ bubble mix and blow a couple. You’ll notice that much like a snowflake, each one is completely unique, but they all have some consistent traits. They are filled with air. They appear invincible when blown because they can be pushed, handled, flicked, or blown. While bubbles can pop from forced air, they often can float along in normal circumstances without immediately popping for quite some time. Their walls appear strong at first, but with time weaken, and they always, always pop, it’s only a matter of time. Size in relationship to wall thickness is also a primary factor in popping… the larger they get, the more imminent the pop.

With that said, let’s discuss the required components of any bubble:

Speculation
What is a bubble filled with? In the conventional world, it is air. So, to begin our discussion, what is speculation, and why would it be like air? The unabridged dictionary.com’s dictionary defines speculation as follows:

Engagement in business transactions involving considerable risk but offering the chance of large gains, esp. trading in commodities, stocks, etc., in the hope of profit from changes in the market price.

Notice both the method (transactions involving considerable risk), the goal (large gains), and mechanism (changes in the market price). You might contrast this with a definition of investment:

the investing of money or capital in order to gain profitable returns, as interest, income, or appreciation in value.

You will notice some key differences here: investing vs. considerable risk; profitable returns vs large gains; and, interest, income, or value appreciation vs. changes in market price.

The primary difference between investment and speculation lies in the expected outcome of the risk-taker, not in the mechanisms by which the transaction takes place. Whereas an investor might purchase an asset for its ability to return regular dividends, a speculator would primarily be interested in later selling the asset to another party at a higher price. There is no time constraint to speculation per se, but generally, shorter periods of time are a speculator’s general intention. This is key when considering the mindset of homebuyers of the last 5 years. At one point, home prices were largely dictated by the investor mindset, in other words, the rental income of a property (or opportunity cost of renting an equivalent property for the owner) could largely cover the monthly expenses and return a reasonable regular return (without selling the asset) that matched the correlated risk the holder was exposed to. An investor is primarily concerned with the long-term, and does not readily consider the market price, but rather the value of regular returns. A speculator’s entire purchase, on the other hand, is governed by whether or not a later sale can be executed at a higher price.

Speculation is impulsive, and requires a further impulsive buyer; most successful speculation occurs when a temporary shortage or glut causes wide price swings in a shallow market. Deeper markets can absorb temporary supply shocks when investors put off purchases for a period of time. Shallow markets, on the other hand have more volatile swings due to the size of bid and ask lots being inconsistent. Excellent examples of shallow markets are thinly traded stocks or local housing markets. While in deeply traded markets, large price volatility tends to be minimized and relegated primarily to impairment (large earnings shocks vs. consensus expectations), shallow markets can experience price volatility not only from these shocks, but also seemingly benign events such as increased availability of the shortage product compared with demand, or even speculator psychology. This is exactly why areas with high growth tend to experience high price volatility… even small changes in psychology can cause speculators to pack the exits, or gobble up as much as they can get their hands on. Thinly traded markets cannot respond to the ask, and transactions only occur on the sharply downward sloping margin of long-term investors. Bubbles are more easily formed in shallow markets because once an underlying change happens, the entrenched expectation of higher prices in the future creates a self-fulfilling prophecy until the demand exhausts itself. It’s also easy to note that shallow markets initially pop in volume (low volume) immediately prior to price drops.

Because of these factors, one can compare air inside a bubble to speculation. It can be influenced easily by outside forces. In some cases, speculators are perfectly manipulatable… for example, deep-pocketed investors wanting to buy shares on the cheap can easily shake out speculators on thinly traded stocks. Once manipulated speculators, like air, disappear into the market from whence they came. As if it had never existed in the first place.

To investors, fundamental value is primary. To a speculator fundamental value is folly, meaning nothing, and having no worth; the purchase price and sales price are the primary considerations. For an investor, the entire purchase is weighed against alternative investments in various asset classes; everything from risk-free treasuries to junk bonds, to Fortune 100 stocks to startup biotech stocks, from condos to mansions; all with the sole purpose of generating long-term returns for the investor with a reasonable balance of risk of loss to reward.

Every asset has a component of potential cash flow or wealth protection. In stocks, it is dividends or free cash flow discount model. In real estate, it is the discounted rental value. In precious metals, it is primarily a value protection strategy. Every asset class that has value has an intrinsic value based on assumptions that the investors attempt to quantify, discount the present value, and compare against existing prices. Speculation, on the other hand, does not care about intrinsic value, it is expected that a later, higher strike price will allow the speculator to sell and receive a profit, primarily for risk taking and time.

Price Volatility in relation to underlying fundamentals
Price volatility in and of itself does not necessarily signal a “bubble” per se. There are a number of situations where rapidly advancing prices stuck for a long time based on fundamentals. Evenso, Bubbles do not necessarily require a price run-up. In theory, if the fundamentals increasingly deteriorate, the current price that stays put is actually forming a bubble.

In stock bubbles, this is a detachment from price-to-earnings ratios. In housing it is a detachment from rental value. In precious metals, it is the cost to mine and refine (or create) more. In all cases, the fundamental value is based on the discounted cash flows from the future or cost of replacement, whichever is lower. I include the caveat of whichever is lower because assets can be impaired - have future cash flows removed - by external forces, and most things can be compared to like-kind assets that serve as substitutes.

This detachment from fundamentals rarely occurs in the base portion of an asset bubble. In fact, the base serves as an initial reasoning for the later speculation frenzy. It is only when the psychological component of the ever-increasing price of an asset becomes entrenched in participants’ minds that the detatchment occurs. In most cases in history, a bubble is preceded by a legitimate shortage of the bubble asset. This shortage is always temporary, since more can be made, refined, or a substitute provided. Humankind has yet to find a shortage in any asset that cannt be replaced with a suitable substitute. However, it is that original pattern of fundamentals that supports the later mania… short-term history must support the wild speculation with abandon. Else, if risk enters the minds of participants, the asset quickly falls back into alignment with fundamentals. It is only when participants believe that fundamentals don’t matter, that financial bubbles can be defined.

Psychological mania
Greed, while present during a bubble, is also not a sign of a bubble. It is the wild abandon with which greed posesses an otherwise rational mind and drives them to excesses which men or women under normal circumstances would abhor. Greed is a required component of a bubble.

Correlation, however is not causation. Consider a scientist who does experiments on men who eat onions and observes that these men have nearly half the incidence of heart attacks. However, was it really the onions which provided better heart health? Perhaps these men were predisposed to a healthier lifestyle with a higher intake of raw vegetables which was the actual primary determinant. Or, perhaps their chronic bad breath reduced their likelihood to marry a nagging wife? Either way, eating onions would not necessarily be the cause of better heart health simply because there is a correlation. There must be a logical direct link between a cause and effect.

However, greed is a human condition that exists during all economic periods. It is not relegated solely to bubble markets.

Participants must believe wholeheartedly in the inability of the asset to be constrained by fundamental beliefs. Some might even compare this with religion, however irrationality is so strong in a financial mania that even when participants are presented with irrefutable proof of its existence, they wipe away the facts as personal biases. No longer do facts reign, but a filter is placed on participants’ minds. Only the good news filters through.

It is important that any investor keep an even keel to make rational decisions about the present value of an investment. The same as it is with any asset. When someone says that it is always a good time to buy, or a good time to sell (an asset), that irrationality has sunk in.

The most fundamental concept of investing is the concept of timing. The most fundamental flaw in most participants logic is that the asset provides more than just money… everything that costs money is an investment and can be traded again for money, nothing more.

Oftentimes, those attempting to prove that a bubble exists can easily pass over this critical component… it is often the strongest of all forces within a financial mania. No financial bubble ever existed without a convicted audience promoting the asset until it collapses.

Abundant lending or enabling forces
Speculators often commit very little personal wealth to the speculative endeavor… because it involves substantial risk and human nature seeks to manage risk. Speculators seek out opportunities to capture large gains and minimize losses as much as possible. Akin to chewing off a limb when stuck in a trap so that the body is released, the speculator seeks to minimize the downside effects of a false step. This is not to say that investors would do otherwise, but rather the impulsive nature of speculation requires the participant to place something in harm’s way. Investors generally seek to avoid the risky situation altogether or find situations where long-term perseverance wins out for the intended objective. Investors can and often will wait out a temporary downturn; speculators cannot and will not since their risk and commitment has been minimized.

In financial bubbles, the primary enabling force has been unsecured lending. Unsecured in the sense that the loss has no recourse to the borrower’s personal assets, only the investment asset. In the case of stock bubbes, this is often buying equities on margin. In housing, it is low-down lending. However, it must be noted that late in speculative bubbles, participants become more and more daring, committing ever larger personal stakes in their endeavors, causing the eventual downturn when transaction velocities crumble.

Because the speculator has little committed, their returns can be multiplied when the transaction favors their business. On the other hand, in highly leveraged bubbles, speculators only lose their minimal investment. It is that lack of personal responsibility and personal investment that causes participants to take greater and greater risks, believing that the investment ALWAYS goes up. Then, if something causes the price to go down, most believe it is temporary, or internalize the cause. This is why financial bubbles end in pops… early signals for speculators to exit are ignored until it is too late.

The Bubble Defined
Financial manias are primarily psychological events, however since psychology (like air in a bubble) is not easily measured, other attributes must be observed to determine if a bubble or financial mania exists. Like a real bubble, it is only a matter of time before a financial bubble pops.

Flipper Nation: A Call to SoCal Flippers

Chuck Ponzi November 17th, 2006

Remember “Bubbles are for Bathtubs”?

You might enjoy this one then:

Welcome Flipper Nation! A good sense of humor is always welcome here.

A look back in time: One of Our Favorites Part 1

Chuck Ponzi November 16th, 2006

Source
Interview with Joel Rassman, Toll Brothers Executive on June 9, 2005 by Marketwatch correspondent John Spence for WSJ.com Real Estate Journal

Q. Is there a housing bubble?

I don’t think so. If we see an adjustment caused by something we don’t envision, it’s likely to be similar to the situation in the San Francisco market caused by a loss in jobs when the dot-com bubble burst. There was a rollback in home prices for a year, but then the market came back even though the jobs didn’t return.

That’s where we are in most parts of the country. Again, there’s a supply and demand imbalance that tempers any unusual activity in the short-term.

Q. Toll Brothers has been growing rapidly. What’s the outlook for the company?

We had a great last quarter — everything fell into place. Our results were terrific, and we have a record backlog. Our visibility leads us to believe we’ll be able to do 70% higher earnings this year above last year, and about 20% next year compared with this year. Last year was 57% higher than the year before, so we’ve seen solid growth, and we expect more.

Q. Is Toll Brothers more resistant to higher interest rates and a weaker job market, since its customers tend to be wealthier and retired?

In general, we have a more affluent buyer base. The average price of a Toll Brothers home is about $650,000.

That translates into protection against interest-rate increases for our customers. But for the industry in general, if interest rates were going up because the economy is improving due to higher employment and wages, it could offset the rate increases.

Also, there’s been a lot of talk about the Federal Reserve slowing rate increases, since inflation appears to be in check. So the concern over rising interest rates may be overplayed.

Anyone else care to make any prognostications if the pros couldn’t get their own business right?

The Biggest Loser: NAR

Chuck Ponzi November 10th, 2006

While I have been on the record many times that I see nothing wrong with good real estate agents, it has been clear that the National Association of Realtors (NAR) is attempting to perpetuate a stranglehold on the real estate industry that puts buyers and sellers at a disadvantage such that milks both of their hard-earned money.

Such is the case with this week’s NAR propaganda campaign to sucker fence-sitters into a clearly declining price market. Many other bubble bloggers siezed on the opportunity to show how incredibly two-faced it is to state that it is both a good time to buy and to sell. (Imagine a stockbroker, or any other advisor trying to tell you anything similar about the product they deal in). The Truth is that it is A Great Time to Generate a Commission.

Such is also the case with the arrogant prick (is there any other way to describe him?) Allan Dalton of Move.com (aligned with the NAR) who led a heated attack against competing information broker Zillow. And, might I add, a personal attack against Zillow’s founder, Lloyd Frink.

Perhaps, taken apart, these 2 incidents only show a single facet of the information-mongering stance the NAR has taken. A stance, by the way, that the Attorney General is considering to be anti-competitive and monopolistic and has hauled them to court to prove it. These practices attempt to bully discount brokers and information outlets into submission. The NAR’s arrogance, it appears, knows no bounds.

So, the question remains… why buy with them?

Simply, they still control the information. They control whether you know which houses are for sale. They have money, and lots of it, from grafting nearly every real estate transaction. They are fools if they believe their industry is not changing. They are even having dissent within their ranks.

While I don’t believe that commissions will completely go away, I do believe that Selling agents will become more and more competitive to reflect increased competition through the massive influx of new agents, and I believe that Buying agents will continue to do what Brad Davidson of HelpUBuy realty does… give away much of their commissions to attract self-serve buyers.

The fact is, most people have access to MLS data already through the internet. It is only a matter of time before a Google, MSN, or Yahoo breaks ranks and trounces the MLS to oblivion by offering their own similar information-brokering services. Not only will a new player in the arena help buyers, if their services are priced competitively, they might replace some of the local MLS systems altogether. Once a few fall… it’s only a matter of time before it snowballs.

David Hume said it well:

Where men are the most sure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there given reins to passion, without that proper deliberation and suspense, which can alone secure them from the grossest absurdities.
David Hume - 18th Century Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist

The NAR is sowing the seeds of its own destruction.

Interest Rates Gettin You Down?

Chuck Ponzi November 3rd, 2006


Well, you’re not the only one.

And, we found out earlier this week that productivity has abated, while wage pressures are mounting… Signaling potentially more inflation. So, enjoy your low interest rates while you can.

If the bond market has called it wrong and the FED is required to raise rates, not lower them any time soon, we could see the short end of the yield curve rise, putting even more pressure on the long end. That snap-back of the yield curve might just lead to a credit event… the unwinding of which could cause housing lending to really stop in its tracks (relative to current practices, not historically).

There is already evidence that the FED’s move might be a move up next. Lacker (the one dissenting FED voice) has repeatedly signaled to resume upward movements to the interest rates. And, although the world’s central banks have not recently taken up the cause, there is mounting dissent that the world is awash in a sea of liquidity that needs to be mopped up with higher interest rates.

Bloomberg delivers the news:

Interest rates in the main economies have still not been raised enough,” says Tim Congdon, visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and one of the “wise men” who advised the U.K. Treasury in the 1990s. “There is a buoyancy in asset prices one gets with high-risk monetary growth.”
Without further tightening, central bankers may have new asset bubbles and inflation risks on their hands. The European Central Bank, whose officials voice the most concern, is convening a conference in Frankfurt next week on the role of money growth in guiding interest rate policy. Among participants: Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan and Bank of Japan Deputy Governor Kazumasa Iwata.

With a depressed long end already inverted, and a rising short-end, we could have an almost sure signal that we are entering recession. However, MarketWatch’s Rex Nutting reports that it may not be that simple.

The inverted yield curve does not cause a recession; it’s just a signal of a pending slowdown.

“Forecasters are really bad at forecasting recessions,” said Lakshman Achuthan, managing director at Economic Cycle Research Institute, which did forecast the 2001 recession, based on ECRI’s own leading economic indicators.

Achuthan doesn’t think the yield curve is the “holy grail of economic forecasting.”

“The yield curve doesn’t pass our test to be included in our leading indicators,” he said. His firm is not forecasting a recession this year or next, but is “by no means bullish.”

In fact, there have been some false positive indicators in the past:

The recession odds have been above 50% eight times in the past 45 years. Six times, a recession followed within a year. The only occasions the economy avoided a recession were in the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, both periods when the federal government flooded the economy with fiscal stimulus, noted David Rosenberg, chief North American economist for Merrill Lynch.

That fiscal stimulus, is however, unlikely to surface (the mid 60’s and mid 80’s were 2 major rewrites of the tax code to lower higher marginal taxes) with our current federal deficit. If it were to surface, the purchasing value of the Dollar might negate any stimulus this might provide, causing foreign goods to become more expensive.

But, that might already be upon us.

China is exporting their inflation to us by buying US treasuries. No, it is not so much a blame as it is a statement of fact. China’s ballooning currency reserves are one of many pressures keeping the long-end of the yield curve depressed. This week, we found out that their currency reserves have reached nearly $1 Trillion; estimated to be 70% in USD. Is our inversion simply a manifestation of our own undoing by a sea of trillions of US dollars desperately seeking returns? If so, our recession indicator may not so much signal the prescience of the bond market as much as it shows how economic cycles are born. Excess monetary stimulus seeks ever lower returns, finally exhausting itself by taking on greater risk than a return will support. Because risk is detatched from credit decisions by months or years, it is usually far too late to stop the excessive risk taking before the clear signs surface.

Bringing it Together

The worst part of this is imagining it all being brought together at once. Imagine if investors caught a whiff of Lacker’s higher inflation, increased risk aversion, and China begins a rebalancing or reduction of US reserves? The result could be catastrophic to our debt-based economy. No longer would borrowing be cheap. No longer would funding be plentiful. No longer would assets be liquid.

It reminds us of something Greenspan said last year:

This vast increase in the market value of asset claims is in part the indirect result of investors accepting lower compensation for risk. Such an increase in market value is too often viewed by market participants as structural and permanent… But what they perceive as newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear. Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that supported higher asset prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low-risk premiums.

The part that is not surprising, is that all of the evidence was here for months, if not years for everyone to see. The part that is surprising (at least to me) is that so many ignored it for so long. Any amount of use asset inflation will at some point translate into core inflation when each person recalibrates their spending accordingly. There is no such thing as a free lunch. Monetary inflation endly leads to inflation of all kinds, there is no other way out.

What does this mean to the housing market in Southern California?

Our current housing prices are fueled entirely by easy, cheap credit, as is evidenced by our high ARM content, and astronomical house-price to income ratios. If a credit event does occur, we have the most to lose. However, all other unwinding scenarios depends on many other moving parts of our global economy to work in clockwork like precision. While the current slowdown is a manifestation of the bubble stretching under its own weight, it is likely that the added pressure of a credit event (and likely even the perfect unwinding as described) would pancake the entire housing and local retail economies that are so dependent on lending. While I would admit I still don’t believe the residential real estate bubble has yet popped, the true test of future direction will be in the credit markets over the next year, not in the for-sale housing market.