Cash-out Refinancing Caused the Crash

As I have been saying since I began the blog some 4 years ago, the majority of pain that homeowners are feeling was self-inflicted.  Today, Inman news reports to us on MIT’s Sloan School of business study on home-equity raping and the cause of so many foreclosures.  The money shot?

estimating that without cash-out refinancings and other withdrawals of homeowner equity, only 3 percent of outstanding mortgages would have been underwater at the end of last year

Basically, mortgage borrowers bought the rope to hang themselves.

I would recommend reading the entire article, but here’s an excerpt:

The study didn’t take into account the behavior of lenders or the supply of money available to refinance, instead assuming that borrowers could refinance as often as they wished at prevailing interest rates. That may have been pretty much the case in the decade leading up to the market’s June 2006 peak, the study said, with homeowners eager to take on debt and lenders only too willing to accommodate them.

But the study illustrates a more subtle problem than the “dysfunctional individual and institutional behavior” exhibited during the boom, said authors Amir E. Khandani, Andrew W. Lo, and Robert C. Merton.

“While excessive risk-taking, overly aggressive lending practices, pro-cyclical regulations, and political pressures surely contributed to the recent problems in the U.S. housing market, our simulations show that even if all homeowners, lenders, investors, insurers, rating agencies, regulators, and policymakers behaved rationally, ethically, and with the purest of motives, financial crises can still occur,” the study said.

“Near frictionless” refinancing opportunities, when they occur simultaneously with declining interest rates and rising home prices, create a “ratchet” effect in which homeowners exchange the equity they’ve built in their homes for debt they can’t easily “unwind,” the study said.

The situation poses a risk for lenders, too. A formerly diverse pool of borrowers — some who’d had comfortable levels of equity in their homes, and loans that were well on their way to being paid off — becomes synchronized, as if each had bought their homes at the height of the market with the highest allowable loan-to-value ratios.

When home prices decline, lenders have no way to compel homeowners to add more equity, like the margin calls employed by stock brokers when investors buy shares with borrowed money. Unlike equities investors who can sell off part of their portfolio to meet a margin call, homeowners can’t sell part of their home to reduce their debt ratio.

There’s no easy way to address the “refinancing ratchet effect,” the study said, because the three factors that can lead to trouble — declining interest rates, rising home prices, and easy access to mortgage loans — are “benign market conditions” often seen as indicators of economic growth.

“No easy legislative or regulatory solutions exist, such as prohibiting the Fed from cutting interest rates below a certain threshold, or placing a ceiling on housing prices, or putting ‘sand in the gears’ of the refinancing system and limiting consumer credit,” the study said.

In the end, were using the money from refinancing to supplement declining income, as was the case of a short sale I recently went to see with Brad Davidson (co-blogger and Broker at We-Help-U-Buy).  The homeowner had purchased some 20+ years earlier, but had withdrawn over $500K in the last decade.  Meanwhile, not a cent was put into home maintenance as the entire place was original.  In fact, she had cost the home probably $10K in damage to the in-ground pool draining too quickly because the pool pump broke and she didn’t have $800 to replace it.  (Hydrostatic pressure will do some interesting things to concrete when the opposing force is removed.

The most amazing thing to me during the housing downturn is the number and amount of refis that I have seen.  It seems MOST of Southern California took out several hundred thousand dollars each from their houses; enough to buy entire houses outright in most other places in the country.  Some of the most amazing and bizarre examples have been in the wealthiest enclaves, likely in an attempt to keep up with the Jones’.  This kind of insanity is well-documented in IrvineRenter’s Southern California’s Cultural Pathology.

The road ahead is still going to be fraught with disaster, as it will take us decades to rebuild our consumer balance sheets after having pulled so much of our income forward through equity withdrawals.  Let’s hope that we can do it sooner than later.

 

Are We There Yet?

ArewethereyetThis post is being put out for those readers who are seeing the unfolding of 2009 and wonder if we are at a housing bottom. Indeed, volumes have increased dramatically, and one can hardly turn on the tv, radio, or internet without being barraged with news that the housing market has hit bottom and is quickly recovering. I understand why one would be confused. After all, the housing market has improved, and the global stock market is deeply in rally territory after hitting rock bottom in March. However, this is time time when one has to ask themselves why they were waiting to buy a house in the first place. Was it because it was too expensive? Was it because you were worried about prices slipping more? Or, was it just because you wanted to catch the bottom and look like a genius in 10 more years? Well, if any of these motivations, you’ll have different answers of when to buy.

If you waited to buy a house because it was too expensive, ask yourself, is it too expensive now?  This is the easiest concern to get over.  In the throes of the housing bubble, you would have been told by your agent that you should just lower your expectations.  Buy a smaller place.  Buy a place further out.  Buy a place you don’t want, but can afford.  I’ll dispel any myths, there is no such thing as a crystal ball.  Just as I tell you that scamsters like Gary Watts didn’t know was going to happen, we also only operated on verifiable information.  All information is telling us that while a bit of affordability has returned, the underlying problems with the housing market still exist.  Let’s outline those quickly:

1.  Housing exceeds healthy income limits for much of Southern California (inland areas are back to a healthy level, so this really only refers to coastal areas, and some pockets throughout.

2.  Interest rates are low, masking the affordability problems mentioned above.  Rates are low because the Federal Reserve is intentionally targeting mortgage rates by purchasing up to 50% of all issued mortgage paper.  This is only intended to be temporary, and at some point, not only will this be removed, the current leverage must be unwound.  It is likely that interest rates will proceed higher.  While noone can know for sure when this will be done, it is likely to have an impact in the 2nd half of 2010 and into 2011.

3.  Unemployment in Southern California is increasing.  This is a known fact, and is expected to peak sometime in 2010 if things immediately improve.  However, it is expected that the decline will be less than steep, and high unemployment could persist for up to 5  more years after the recession ends.  Add in that California has become a very difficult place for many businesses to continue due to high taxes and infrastructure problems, and many companies are looking at alternatives if they upstaff.  Only lower wages will attract them back.  Lower wages do not increase home prices.

4.  The option-arm Tsunami has not come yet.  With an expected default rate that is much higher than subprime, and a concentration in coastal California, much of pain that inland areas sufferend is expected to occur in the more expensive areas.  If this materializes, buyers today are “catching the falling knife”.  The option arm recasts are expected to peak starting this quarter and cresting late 2010 and not declining until 2011 or 2012.

5.  The move-up market is dead.  The most starkly different part of this bust versus prior busts is that many, many people over-leveraged their houses even more than their increase in value.  Indeed, so many people are underwater at prices that locals can afford that it’s impossible for the majority of home buyers to move up at all.  This is one of the reasons that the low end is the most active areas.  Higher areas are simply over-priced for locals who fear for their jobs and have suffered a calamitous stock market setback.

6.  The banking system is unhealthy.  Leverage, and indeed money supply is decreasing.  This is the backside of a debt-fueled overcapacity bubble.  First, it was businesses that were overleveraged.  Then it was households.  Soon, it will be government, and there won’t be enough income to support the levels of debt and still account for imperfections in the system.  Someday, we’ll worry about

So, if you’re still interested in buying after knowing all of that, don’t say nobody warned you.  I understand, sometimes the social peer pressures push us to do irrational things.  Just look back at the bubble.  And, with the seemingly invincible Federal Government pulling out all stops to stimulate housing sales and ownership, it might seem that you just want to throw in the towel and give it up.  I know, I’ve wondered if it’s worth the wait.  I won’t think bad of anybody who buys now.

However, if you’re waiting for prices to come down more, I believe they will, but don’t fool yourself, no one will intentionally catch the bottom.  I don’t believe we’ll see the bottom until noone cares anymore, that’s how bubbles work historically.  We are, however, still pulling demand from the future.  We’ll overshoot by that much, at some point.  It can be fast and painful, or it can be slow and painful.  Either way, we haven’t had pain in the coastal areas yet.

Besides, if you’re wanting people to think you’re a genius, you might be surprised to find that no one likes the smartest guy in the room.  I know a lot of Goldman Sachs employees are finding that out.

 

Feeling Down?

Not for long. At least we all have good crappy music to enjoy the crash by.

 

Consider the above video in light of Chris Whalen’s post today at The Big Picture: Q2 2009 Bank Stress Test Results: The Zombie Dance Party Rocks On

There are some thoughts that Chris presents that are of utmost interest here:

Plain fact is that the Fed and Treasury spent all the available liquidity propping up Wall Street’s toxic asset waste pile and the banks that created it, so now Main Street employers and private investors, and the relatively smaller banks that support them both, must go begging for capital and liquidity in a market where government is the only player left. The notion that the Fed can even contemplate reversing the massive bailout for the OTC markets, this to restore normalcy to the monetary models that supposedly inform the central bank’s deliberations, is ridiculous in view of the capital shortfall in the banking sector and the private sector economy more generally.

Perhaps there is revisionist thinking at the Fed at long last, but not nearly soon enough to do anything about the impending implosion of the US banking sector in 2010. The significant point to us is not the cost to the FDIC insurance fund implied by the rising Bank Stress Index score, a cost which the banking industry will absorb and repay. But the real point is the permanent diminution of economic activity in local communities caused when good community and regional banks die due to the end-result of bad fiscal and regulatory policies in Washington.

There are a boat load of smaller banks that are being put into crisis through the crowding out effect of government influence with heavy-handed intervention.  Sooner or later, either the propped up banks be allowed to fail, or they will cause many more smaller banks to fail.  Which would you rather have?