Andy Xie of Morgan Stanley has written some of the best commentary describing the innerworkings and problems of the Chinese bubble (don’t ask me if there is one, although it sounds like there is, I have not done my homework, as I’m sure Andy has).

Some time ago, he wrote Chinese asset markets have become a giant Ponzi scheme that perked up my ears and got me to thinking.

But, his more recent piece in Caing has me thinking he’s talking about Southern California:

The overwhelming desire for getting rich quick dominates every nook, fissure and strata of Chinese society.

Ok, replace “Chinese” with California, and you’ve got a definite match.

Bubbles exaggerate reality but are not formed out of thin air. Cheap money and strong growth are the usual ingredients for bubble-making.

This is almost exactly what I wrote with “What is a bubble?” several years ago.  However, most interestingly is what is happening in China, and happened in California:

China’s property market is creating winners and losers based on timing. All other factors – including education and experience — have been marginalized as the economy rewards speculators. And as more play the game, the speculator ranks rise and fewer people work, perhaps contributing to a labor shortage.

This is exactly what happened during Southern California’s property bubble.  Many people got rich simply by being in the right place at the right time.  Many of them were incapable of understanding the circumstances of the rise, and so therefore simply did more of the same (buy real estate) without understanding the underlying problem that widespread repetition of that practice would cause a housing shortage (too many people “storing” housing instead of allowing it to be bought).  Rents reflected the “real demand”, and appreciated strongly.  Meanwhile, properties exploded with enough appreciation in 2 years to account for 30 years of inflation to support the prices.

The most poignant in my mind was a short-sale that Brad (my co-blogger and realtor) and I visited.  The original owner was trying to sell from a purchase made in 1996 at more than 300K lower than the short-sale.  The “owner” was so destitute that when the pool pump broke and they were unable to replace the $800 unit, the resulting ground shift due to hydrostatic pressure when quickly emptying the pool caused many more thousands in damage to the surrounding concrete.  They had been trying to support a 600K+ mortgage with a single income from working at Macy’s.  When regular equity withdrawals worked, the Ponzi scheme continued.

In normal times, the ponzi would have never worked, but because of the bubble, it allowed the “owner” to continue to persist in a property many times more expensive than they could support.  At the peak of the market, this would have sold for more than $1M, requiring the income of several well-paid professionals, not a single retail salesperson’s income.  The world did not make sense in 2006.

This separation of is true of a speculation/investment-centric economy.  This is part of the reason why most people make terrible investors; the concept of time is nebulous and fraught with uncertainty.  Indeed, I wrote (and bolded) in What is a Bubble? the following:

The most fundamental concept of investing is the concept of timing. The most fundamental flaw in most participants logic is that the asset provides more than just money… everything that costs money is an investment and can be traded again for money, nothing more.

This Southern California phenomenon of irrational belief has been covered extensively in another blogger’s repertoire, Irvine Renter’s Southern California’s Cultural Pathology.

We are quickly approaching the Day of Reckoning in our housing market. In my view this will be Armageddon for California debtors: the spending will stop, they will lose their homes and with it their illusion of wealth, and they most definitely will not be enjoying life. The cause of all the weeping and gnashing of teeth will not be some exogenous event, but rather a direct result of the circumstances they themselves created.

My thoughts exactly.

 

All Ur Houses are belong to us!

reo-chart-data-as-of-october

Any thoughts as to why over the last 1.5 years, 90 day lates have doubled while bank owned halved?

Any conspiracy theories?

 

“Substantial” Bank Losses are Needed

USA-FED/BERNANKE

Let me state right now that I couldn’t care less one way or another about debt forgiveness, but many who propose to just “forgive” debt forget 2 main arguments for not doing it.

1.  Banks can’t stay solvent and still do it.  Our entire banking system will probably collapse if wholesale write offs take place too quickly.

2. If you let one person do it, you gotta let ‘em all do it.  Foreclosures are still the best way to liquidate debt.

Bloomberg’s all over it.

Dec. 14 (Bloomberg) — Banks will need to take “substantial” writedowns on home-equity loans to enable loan modifications that will allow the U.S. housing market to recover, according to Amherst Securities Group LP.

The government’s mortgage-modification program will fail to avert many of the 9 million to 10 million looming foreclosures because it doesn’t reduce principal for borrowers, about a quarter of whom owe more than the current values of their houses, Laurie Goodman, a New York-based mortgage-bond analyst at Amherst, said today in a Bloomberg Radio interview.

“It’s important to realize the largest second-lien holders are the largest banks, and there’s going to have to be some very substantial writedowns if you go to a principal-reduction program,” Goodman said. “And this is going to have to be addressed head-on.”

 

Whether you like it or not, the truth is that the middle class has been squeezed over the past 30 years, as Elizabeth Warren of Harvard Law and the House Oversight Committee explains in the attached video.  it’s almost an hour long, but one of the most fascinating analysis I’ve ever seen with after and in-depth research into what is causing fundamental shifts in spending in the US within the middle class.  She touches on the role of women entering the workforce en masse and some definitely surprising findings (we are spending more on housing, but not really getting so much more out of it).  Healthcare, food, clothing, etc.

I would remind readers, though, that predicting is a difficult art to perfect.  As Elizabeth herself states, she would have herself been surprised by the outcome of the pressures.  In the same way, “collapse” is probably a misnomer.  We will adjust, but with a quite different set of priorities.  Technology has improved many parts of our lives; but has contributed little to our happiness.  Our ancestors would probably be surprised how little we do with our large amount of spare time, but surprised at how hard much stress our daily lives entail; which is probably the biggest toll that the housing bubble has had on America; the human cost is much greater than the monetary cost, especially considering that our children and grandchildren will pay dearly for our stupidity over the past 5 years.

 

Cash-out Refinancing Caused the Crash

As I have been saying since I began the blog some 4 years ago, the majority of pain that homeowners are feeling was self-inflicted.  Today, Inman news reports to us on MIT’s Sloan School of business study on home-equity raping and the cause of so many foreclosures.  The money shot?

estimating that without cash-out refinancings and other withdrawals of homeowner equity, only 3 percent of outstanding mortgages would have been underwater at the end of last year

Basically, mortgage borrowers bought the rope to hang themselves.

I would recommend reading the entire article, but here’s an excerpt:

The study didn’t take into account the behavior of lenders or the supply of money available to refinance, instead assuming that borrowers could refinance as often as they wished at prevailing interest rates. That may have been pretty much the case in the decade leading up to the market’s June 2006 peak, the study said, with homeowners eager to take on debt and lenders only too willing to accommodate them.

But the study illustrates a more subtle problem than the “dysfunctional individual and institutional behavior” exhibited during the boom, said authors Amir E. Khandani, Andrew W. Lo, and Robert C. Merton.

“While excessive risk-taking, overly aggressive lending practices, pro-cyclical regulations, and political pressures surely contributed to the recent problems in the U.S. housing market, our simulations show that even if all homeowners, lenders, investors, insurers, rating agencies, regulators, and policymakers behaved rationally, ethically, and with the purest of motives, financial crises can still occur,” the study said.

“Near frictionless” refinancing opportunities, when they occur simultaneously with declining interest rates and rising home prices, create a “ratchet” effect in which homeowners exchange the equity they’ve built in their homes for debt they can’t easily “unwind,” the study said.

The situation poses a risk for lenders, too. A formerly diverse pool of borrowers — some who’d had comfortable levels of equity in their homes, and loans that were well on their way to being paid off — becomes synchronized, as if each had bought their homes at the height of the market with the highest allowable loan-to-value ratios.

When home prices decline, lenders have no way to compel homeowners to add more equity, like the margin calls employed by stock brokers when investors buy shares with borrowed money. Unlike equities investors who can sell off part of their portfolio to meet a margin call, homeowners can’t sell part of their home to reduce their debt ratio.

There’s no easy way to address the “refinancing ratchet effect,” the study said, because the three factors that can lead to trouble — declining interest rates, rising home prices, and easy access to mortgage loans — are “benign market conditions” often seen as indicators of economic growth.

“No easy legislative or regulatory solutions exist, such as prohibiting the Fed from cutting interest rates below a certain threshold, or placing a ceiling on housing prices, or putting ‘sand in the gears’ of the refinancing system and limiting consumer credit,” the study said.

In the end, were using the money from refinancing to supplement declining income, as was the case of a short sale I recently went to see with Brad Davidson (co-blogger and Broker at We-Help-U-Buy).  The homeowner had purchased some 20+ years earlier, but had withdrawn over $500K in the last decade.  Meanwhile, not a cent was put into home maintenance as the entire place was original.  In fact, she had cost the home probably $10K in damage to the in-ground pool draining too quickly because the pool pump broke and she didn’t have $800 to replace it.  (Hydrostatic pressure will do some interesting things to concrete when the opposing force is removed.

The most amazing thing to me during the housing downturn is the number and amount of refis that I have seen.  It seems MOST of Southern California took out several hundred thousand dollars each from their houses; enough to buy entire houses outright in most other places in the country.  Some of the most amazing and bizarre examples have been in the wealthiest enclaves, likely in an attempt to keep up with the Jones’.  This kind of insanity is well-documented in IrvineRenter’s Southern California’s Cultural Pathology.

The road ahead is still going to be fraught with disaster, as it will take us decades to rebuild our consumer balance sheets after having pulled so much of our income forward through equity withdrawals.  Let’s hope that we can do it sooner than later.

 

MeltdownToday I came across a detailed analysis of the mortgage meltdown in California along with detailed graphs, long-term analysis, and an indepth look at where we are in the overall housing bubble.

The T2 Partners paper provided by More Mortgage Meltdown can be downloaded here:

I recommend looking over the entire presentation, as it provides a play by play of where we have come in the last 3 years, and what to expect for the coming 3 years.  I agree with the general assessment that we are in the middle innings of the overall price declines (perhaps in Inning 5 of 9), but the real movement is yet to come in the middle and high-end price tiers.  Of course, there is no way of accounting for significant outside involvement that might change that outcome, however any change must be structural and permanent (such as offering citizenship to anyone purchasing real estate, offering 20% of the purchase price, no questions asked by the government, or total global thermonuclear war.  I doubt many can understand what those outcomes would look like, so we’ll focus on the most likely scenarios.

The key is really what is happening and will continue to happen California. Their assesment, given by Mark Hanson, is in my opinion spot on to how I expect the next 2 years to play out:

California housing — at the low end — is ‘bottoming’ mostly because: a) median prices are down 55% from their peak over the past two years, thereby making the low end affordable; b) foreclosures have temporarily been cut by 66% through moratoriums reducing supply; and c) demand is picking up going into the busy season.
But the moratoriums are ending and the number of foreclosures in the pipeline is massive — they will start showing themselves as REO over the near to mid-term. The Obama plan held the foreclosure wave back, creating a huge backlog and now the servicers are testing hundreds of thousands of defaults against the new loss mitigation initiatives. We presently see the Notice of Defaults at record highs and Notice of Trustee Sales back up to 9 month highs — there is no reason for a loan to go to the Notice of Trustee Sale stage if indeed it wasn’t a foreclosure. However, the new ‘batch’ are not only from the low end but a wide mix all the way up to several million dollars in present value.
Because the majority of buyers are in ultra low and low-mid prices ranges, the supply-demand imbalance from foreclosures and organic supply will crush the mid-to-upper priced properties in 2009. We already have early seasonal hard data proving this. As the mid-to-upper end go through their respective implosions this year and the volume of sales in these bands increase as prices tumble, the mix shift will raise median and average house prices creating the ultimate in false bottoms. We also have data proving this phenomenon.

You can find this narrative (and much more) on slide 62.

 

This is a great lead-in to what the credit bubble is and how it happened. Delves deep and stays on target.

 

Financial Crisis and Magical Thinking

What is magical thinking?  It is a detachment of causality from the source of an action.  It is simply, to believe that if certain conditions are met, a natural outcome is to be expected.

Magical thinking comes in many flavors, but isn’t entirely unuseful.  It helps when systems are so complex that it would take so much time to simply understand the system of events required that it would be impractical to act before a rational decision could no longer be effective.  Much of what we see today in public economic forums is massive amounts of magical thinking.  That somehow, if we meet certain conditions of yesteryear, we will “put a floor” in on home prices, the stock market, and the economy as a whole.  Unfortunately, we are in some cases only delaying the inevitable, and in many cases worsening the outcome of the housing bubble.

In a rational, efficient market, participants act in a personally beneficial way.  Often, when participants act in a personally beneficial way, this benefits society as a whole.  However, because the system of decisions needed is inherently complex, a bit of the system sometimes needs to be mentally “fudged” to make the whole issue work.  This is often what people mean when they refer to the “50,000 foot view”.  In centralized organizations, a leader with this type of view depend on their underlings being able to translate this kind of vision with on-the-ground experience to execute the plan.

Some examples that have recently come to the forefront:
1.    Provide a tax credit to homebuyers

2.    Banks failures cause more hardship than paying to save them

3.    Large industrial producers cannot be reduced because they will crash our economy

Tax Credit to Homebuyers:

Unfortunately, it appears that we have more turned into a Cargo Cult that focuses not on the productive activities, but to somehow hearken back the golden days of yore through repeating the same stupid rituals that brought the original cargo planes and our former riches.  This is a complete erosion of the American fabric; a lie to western peoples that economists know the way out better than prudent business people.

Many in the government have noted that in the last 20 years, rising home prices produced a large benefit to homeowners.  They were able to borrow against their houses to fund growth in the economy.  The solution to our ailing consumption, it must mean, that houses are undervalued and need to be propped up.  Never mind that the last 20 years has been an historical aberration, a flyspeck on the overvalued of all overvalues.  In our current policy, “reversion to trend” means an upward reversion of the home price appreciation to +10% per year.  No matter that in many locales in the US, our incomes have not kept pace with the cost of homes and therefore we are already dedicating too much of our income to housing.  We all need a REDUCTION in home prices for consumer spending to increase.  Anything else (such as increased incomes) would put us as a country even further behind in competitiveness with respect to global wage arbitrage.  I’m not a purist in the sense that I feel that we need to have a large manufacturing base, but our economy has got to consist of more than trading houses and debt amongst ourselves.  The longer we wait to realize this and return incentives to work, risk, and honest reward, the more we as a country suffer.  There should never be a return to leisurely earning above the rest of the world because there is no such thing as barriers to entry in the long run.  Eventually, our wealth will be eroded if we do not continue to maintain a global competitive advantage (and I don’t mean in financial engineering).

People are currently rational.  They’d love nothing more than to return the heady days of 2007 where they spent willy-nilly on consumer goods.  They really would, but they also realize that the only way to do that is to reduce their consumption of something else.  Something that doesn’t produce much satisfaction in their lives: housing.

Bank Failures

This is perhaps one of the most prevalent of magical thinking.  In the participants mind, the bank failures of the 1930’s created a fear of banks when they failed.  At that time, this had 2 effects:  1.  People would have rather stuffed the money in their mattresses, collapsing monetary velocity and trade.  2.  This collapse of bank deposits put otherwise healthy banks in a more precarious positions since they could not maintain adequate reserve ratios and were then insolvent.  I believe that we do not have this type of environment, partially because of the lessons learned over the past 80 years.  The FDIC creates a kind of buffer that assures accountholders that their money is safe (within limits)  Most can ensure all of their money is safe by maintaining multiple accounts at multiple banks.  People do not want money stuffed in their mattresses, and will only do so if they believe the government will begin to confiscate it.  Harebrained ideas such as an asset tax or cash taxes will assuredly collapse velocity and many banks along with it as depositors choose to stuff Ben Franklins in their pillow cases.

Today’s problem has little to do with the same problems as the 1930s.  Today, the mark-to-market accounting rules have substantially decreased the value of assets that depositors’ money was attached to while bank deposits have not done much.  However, most of those assets should never have been purchased because they were junk to begin with.  Most were a Ponzi Scheme where the greater fool needed to come along before their next balance sheet review or FDIC stress test.  In the past, the FDIC would sieze the bank and sell off the parts, making the secured creditors partially whole and making the equity holders eat dirt.  The shortcomings on depositors would be made whole by the FDIC before anyone else.

Circumventing normal market clearing practices for these liabilities and assets will ensure that the required write-downs necessary to produce never happen and that the remaining “Zombie Banks” will continue in perpetuity with damaged assets; unable to lend due to the need to recapitalize.  More importantly, (or at least as important), the current leadership fails to be deposed; ensuring the problems of yesteryear are never allowed to become discovered and the organization can never move on from prior mistakes.  The leadership is every bit as damaged as the assets the banks hold.  To keep them in place is to reward bad behavior and ensure that we do not have a return to long-term profitable business practices.

Our current populace is engaging in magical thinking to believe that if we just keep the banks alive for a little while longer that they will be able to return from the dead.  The only result will inevitably be zombies; having the appearance of life, but dead and hungry for brains.

Large Industrial Producers

This one is about GM.  I believe this one to be a very different animal than banks and requires a more sophisticated resolution; but let’s be clear: allowing GM to continue to operate without destroying the unions as they now exist is in effect transferring taxpayer money directly to GM union workers.

At the present time, bankruptcy for GM holds 2 major obstacles that are not related to the above
1.    No sufficient Debtor In Posession (DIP) financing exists in the private sector.  Without government intervention, GM could only progress directly to Ch7, which would be a shock to the economy.
2.    Even progressing to a Ch11 bankruptcy protection shows that consumers would likely boycott GM products as a safety measure.

Therefore, you can see that a traditional bankruptcy for GM is not an option if we do not want to add several hundred thousand directly to the dole and probably reach several million before all is said and done.

In the 80’s Chrysler was bailed out with a loan from the government.  It is simply magical thinking to believe that we can make a loan with attractive terms and the whole problem will go away.  The issue is that with each infusion, the company becomes more dependent on the donor.  We are raising a vegetable company.  Therefore, the problem must be attacked with swiftness and exactness.  Most importantly, the 30 and done has to be removed and made retroactive.  Sorry, you shouldn’t be able to retire until 70, and if that sucks, it sucks; get a job lowlife.  None of the rest of America has a cush job with secure retirement; you won’t be getting it either.  Sorry.

However, doing nothing while making large loans that go directly to pension beneficiaries is inherently unfair to workers everywhere and distorts normal competitive markets.  With the kind of money that GM is getting, many skilled could come forward and rebuild a competitive auto company.  The failed leadership that has complained about the problem yet done thing for the last 30 years while foreign competitors ate our lunch cannot be rewarded, nor should bondholders who are essentially being treated like Treasury holders be either.

In conclusion:

I believe our country’s leadership is unable to see how the magical thinking of today will translate into actionable items of tomorrow either because they fail to see personal motivations of participants, or because they have failed to see the solution and worked their way back putting into place contingency plans.  Until we have a workable solution, we will continue to pour money down the drain and extend the recover further.

 

The Problem with Bailouts and “Stimulation”

I am deeply concerned with any talk of a stimulation package.  Prior readers know that I vehemently opposed prior bailout packages, and deemed them “Fear Mongering” by the Federal Reserve and our own Treasury Department.  I still feel so, and believe that our new President has been duped by the same economic advisers who led us into this crisis (yes “Timmay” Geithner).  This country really is going to shit.

A quick and useful synopsis of the problem can be found in a small regional paper from Neuces County.

In one of history’s more candid reflections, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Treasury Secretary under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, confessed, “We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work.”

Just six years after crafting the New Deal, Morgenthau declared that their efforts to create jobs and restore America’s depression-ravaged economy by expanding the federal government to unprecedented levels had been a failure. By Morgenthau’s own assessment, the New Deal saddled our country with “as much unemployment as when we started…and an enormous debt.”

More than 75 years have passed since FDR signed the New Deal into law, and many noted economists are studying the Great Depression and trying to learn from the experience. In 2004, a team of UCLA economists concluded that the policies of the New Deal, which suppressed competition and kept unemployment in the range of nine to 16 percent, actually prolonged the Great Depression by seven years.

Amity Shlaes, an economic scholar and Great Depression historian, has argued that the sheer “arbitrariness” of the New Deal actually exacerbated the crisis.

The crux of the problem is that once you start arbitrarily trying to assign a value better than the collective wisdom of markets, you create a process of compensating factors.  Yes, markets will react only temporarily to any stimulus and will eventually revert to its given path.  Any stimulus will have been wasted.

Yes, payments to “new homeowners” is an arbitrary effort, almost all of whose profits will go to homebuilders (who led us into this mess with overbuilding due to overstimulus) and bankers (who also led us into this mess with overlending due to overstimulus).

I will state categorically that from an economic standpoint, the best thing for the federal government to do is to spend its money on permanent solutions to permanent problems.  Trying to prop up housing prices only leaves us further in debt and beholden to our own currency.  This will not end well, and is getting worse with every dollar given to the Federal Government.

I am outraged at President Obama’s approach.  Unfortunately, it appears that we will have at least 4 more years of unmitigated idiocy, this time aided and abetted by our own Congress.  There is no incentive in America to work hard, do what is right and pay your bills.  Indeed, it seems, never was there a time where it was more prudent to default than now.  You will get to keep all of your past gains, and the government will continue to fund your gains in perpetuity. I’m frankly disgusted that my tax money is going to scum-of-the-earth bankers and homebuilders.

We could really do well to take our tough medicine now and get it over with so we have some growth.  Instead, we have special interests running this country with threats of financial terrorism (give me billions or I’ll blow up your economy and myself) and an out of control President just weeks after taking office.

I’ll give the President a suggestion:  Give me the money and I’ll find a better way to use it.  I’ll set up a bank that will RIGHT NOW hire people, lend to people at below market rates AND make shitloads of money all at the same time.  This absolute garbage of giving current banks TARP money was from the beginning doomed to failure.  I’d like to have loans at 0% that I can then compound 10 times and sell on the open market at 4.5%.

President Obama, I’m ready.  I’m willing.  Just give me the money.

PS, if I happen to take the money and skip town, chalk it up to learning a lesson about giving billions to an anonymous internet blogger.

Tagged with:
 

I think the video speaks for itself:

While he’s not a policy maker, having more media outlets understanding why high housing prices are putting a brake on our economy is critical to getting past the downturn.