Chuck Ponzi July 7th, 2008

Anyone who hasn’t seen the charts for Freddie Mac (FRE) should really take a look at them.  This is definitely a crash in the making.  As of this writing, FRE is down 22% today on news that FRE and FNM CDSs have widened 10BPS.  That is quite an increase.

The funny thing is, I remember less than a year ago, discussions about how Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were well capitalized, preeminently prepared for any disaster, and frankly, as unsinkable as the Titanic.  Little good that has done.  We may be witnessing a historic crash of epic proportions, greater by far than the crash we have seen to date.  To put it in perspective, FRE and FNM have pretty much been the only thing that have kept the real estate market together in the US over the past year.

Consider for a moment this statement regarding the mortgage insurance statistics from the GSEs.

There are more hard numbers available to support MI’s recent surge. MICA, the trade association representing the private mortgage insurance industry, began reporting rising volume monthly after February 2007. For example, mortgage insurers wrote 190 percent more business this year, through April, than in the comparable period of 2006, when subprime/Alt-A were in their heyday.

To put that sort of gain into proper context, consider that even GSE production is only up 160 percent — and they are doing an estimated 80 percent of all new mortgage lending. By inference, MI providers have made huge gains in market share.

Let that sink in for a moment:  GSEs are doing an estimated EIGHTY PERCENT of all mortgage lending, up 160 percent.  IN AN ACTIVELY FALLING MARKET.  Any implied “worst case scenario” imagined last year of the US government bailing out the grossly irresponsible GSE lending facilities is quickly not only becoming a reality, but would represent a necessity unless the entire lending business  in the US becomes STATE OWNED.

State owned lending?

Is that such a bad idea?  I mean, we pretty much have so many controls that we expend an enormous amount of government money in oversight, what’s so wrong with giving the federal government the right to nationalize the largest lenders as they fail?

I’ll write the next part only partially tongue in cheek.

Lending is perhaps one of the great debatable rights of Americans in the 21st century.  We have become so conditioned by its availability to believe that it is owed to us.  We need it, we want it, we should have it.  If we want to create our own financial ruin, and by extension the country’s entire financial ruin, we should be able to do so.  It is our right as Americans.  By this rationale, we should allow all Americans the right to open access to low-cost lending much like clean air, clean water, food and drugs free of harmful contaminants, and an interstate transportation system.

For example, if free enterprise were required to finance our transportation systems, we would be required to pay for every trip we consume on local and long-distance roads.  This is where economics has a hard time playing the role of moral coach, because, frankly, Economics is concerned with the free market and the most efficient method of delivering the utility people desire.  Governments have typically only concerned themselves with PUBLIC NEEDS.  Therefore, the big question is, is real estate lending a PUBLIC NEED?

I am certain that many could make the argument for and against, but perhaps the question needs to be viewed in a longer timeframe.  Is lending STABILITY more important as an ongoing public need to ensure the ability to liquidate lending and homes in an orderly manner?  What controls and insurances should the government provide?  How should the government handle lending standards and manipulation?  Could there be a cross-control against lying using collaboration with the IRS?  What kinds of manipulations would this open up the home lending business to?  Would the government “crowd out” any potential competitors and therefore stifle competition?  Has the current role of home lending harmed the public more than it has helped?

In any case, the general public perception is that home lenders have harmed America, and therefore must be harshly dealt with.  I don’t agree with that.  I personally believe that the problems is on its way to being fixed by the free market, and frankly I’m not happy with the directors of the GSEs getting away with fat pensions, stock options, and the like while the public swallows the bad debt.  On the other hand, it would end, once and for all, the deceptive practices and level the playing field by nationalizing lending.  Frankly put, the government could recapitalize easier than a private entity or a stock-owned entity.

I have to say that I oscillate between incensed outrage and cold acceptance of the reality.  There is no simple answer to that.  Lending has changed forever (hopefully).

• Credit Bubble , Lending Standards , Debt , Housing Crash
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Chuck Ponzi June 21st, 2008

If you’re not in the know on the recent bailout news, there are 3 main points to be aware of:

1. It seems that Bank of America essentially wrote the Dodd Bailout Bill along with Countrywide (merger expected soon). They have probably the most to gain with a generous bailout bill. It helps noone since it doesn’t resolve the fundamental problem of affordability in house, in fact it makes the problem worse. Ever wonder why the 90’s in Japan were referred to as the “lost decade”? It’s because their banking system did the same thing we’re trying to do here. Anyone else see the problem with not punishing gambling banks and housing speculators?

2. The “Subprime Six” were a group of lawmakers given special treatment in exchange for what? What exactly did Senator Dodd besides favorable treatment in his housing financing? What else could be lurking in his past? If you haven’t read about the “Subprime Six”, follow the link. Investor Business Daily, the Wall Street Journal, and the LA times have picked up the story. It’s a story of insider grift and political pandering. If it weren’t so real and true, it might remind me of one of my favorite film lines:

Stuart: Well, it’s a well-known fact, Sunny Jim, that there’s a secret society of the five wealthiest people in the world, known as “The Pentavret.” Who run everything in the world, including the newspapers, and meet tri-annually at a secret country mansion in Colorado known as “The Meadows.”
Tony: So, who’s in this “Pentavret?”
Stuart: The Queen, the Vatican, the Gettys, the Rothschilds, and Colonel Sanders before he went tits up. Oooh, I hated the Colonel, with his wee beady eyes and that smug look on his face. “Oooh you’re gonna buy my chicken, oooh…”
Charlie: Dad? How can you hate the Colonel?
Stuart: Because he puts an addictive chemical in his chicken that makes you crave it fortnightly, smartass.

3. For all of the crap that our President Bush gets, at least he has the foresight to threaten a veto to said bill. There should be no bailout, not just because it’s not fair and would embolden speculators, but because it’s destined to put our banking system in jeapordy for the forseeable future with taxpayers footing the bill. It’s generally understood that this bill has to be done and voted on by July 4th if it is to carry. Any senator that signs this (if it passes) is hopefully going to be thoroughly trounced in the upcoming elections. This is not only unreasonable, it’s unamerican. This place is going to hell in a handbasket. If something like that goes through, I’ll be posting a list of every person that voted for it and their political affiliation here as a feature story.

So, what do I recommend? I’d say get a year’s worth of food and 6 month’s worth of remaining expenses together, if our politicians have any say in it, this is going to be one whopper of a crash and accompanying recession. On the lighter side of things, our grandchildren will be still paying so that people like this can “keep” their homes (and by homes, I mean plural, because, isn’t every good American not just entitled, but guaranteed to own more than one house?).

• Credit Bubble , Debt , Foreclosures
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Chuck Ponzi March 24th, 2008

The following is a copy of a post I made back in November 2005 (nearly 2 1/2 years ago).  Pay close attention to what is supposed to happen next:

from Interest Only - Creative Financing or Harbinger of Deflation?

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

The economists over at Elliott Wave have a great write up about deflation and what causes deflation in a piece titled “What is Deflation and What Causes it to Occur?”

All deflationary periods were marked with the following conditions:
(a) All were set off by a deflation of excess credit. This was the one factor in common.
(b) Sometimes the excess-of-credit situation seemed to last years before the bubble broke.
(c) Some outside event, such as a major failure, brought the thing to a head, but the signs were visible many months, and in some cases years, in advance.
(d) None was ever quite like the last, so that the public was always fooled thereby.
(e) Some panics occurred under great government surpluses of revenue (1837, for instance) and some under great government deficits.
(f) Credit is credit, whether non-self-liquidating or self-liquidating.
(g) Deflation of non-self-liquidating credit usually produces the greater slumps.

From the article: “Self-liquidating credit is a loan that is paid back, with interest, in a moderately short time from production. Production facilitated by the loan - for business start-up or expansion, for example - generates the financial return that makes repayment possible. The full transaction adds value to the economy.”

Credit lent against homes are most definitely non-self-liquidating credit. Unless, you count the opportunity cost of renting as a form of liquidation - however this requires there to be some relationship of rents to monthly payments; something that can’t be said of current market. The relationship of these nonproductive asset backed loans to productive asset backed loans, it would seem is at its peak historically.

Reading this type of semi doom-and-gloom scholarly article makes me think about the many types of financing recently available to the public masses and what impact they might have.

It takes a bit of economic sense to understand a risk premium. A risk premium is an additional amount that a lender expects to compensate them for additional risk. If risk is considered great either a high risk premium is attached or sometimes a transaction cannot take place. We currently have some of the lowest risk premiums in history; interest rates on non-productive assets are at historical lows.

Typically, a lender requires that at some point, principal on the note must be paid back. Interest only loans are an exception to this. Why? And, why have they become popular now?

It’s easy to see why a borrower would want to take on one of these loans; why pay for something now if I can pay later. But, what’s more interesting is why are they so popular for lenders?

Human beings are a fickle bunch. Each one wanting to do something different than the other. Like watching an ant, it runs to and fro, sometimes lost, sometimes productive, but always unpredictable. But, take a step back, and the anthill is an extremely efficient, coordinated jumble of activity. A very predictable bunch. Human financial systems are similar. Each borrower is very unpredictable, but bundle a few thousand together and they suddenly become more predictable; hence the popularity of Mortgage Backed Security Bonds (MBS’s).

BUT… and you knew this was coming… you need to take even a step back to see what is going on in the macro environment. Who has all of this money, and why are they lending it at such low rates. A flat yield curve would signal that lenders see little reason require a larger risk premium for longer-term loans because they expect long-term rates to be about where they are far into the future. How often is the bond market right? Well, that’s for you to decide. Greenspan has even named it a conundrum.

So, this brings me to the title of my post. How could interest only loans signal possible deflation in the future? We already know that low-interest rates can be a signal, but what about creative financing?

Interest only loans cannot be self-liquidating in the short run. When they switch to a liquidating (fully amortized) loan, the payments jump substantially because they do 2 things at once: 1, they begin fully amortizing 2, they adjust to prevailing interest rates. One would expect that people faced with these issues would simply replace the shorter amortizing period with a longer amortizing period at the same rate. Or, they would attempt to liquidate the loan by selling. Since interest-only loans are not self-liquidating in the short run, the bond market is signalling that for the medium-term, interest rates and returns will be low, or that investors are extremely risk-averse to the stock market. The investors feel justified that any possible deflation is offset by the Fed’s moderate inflationary policy, or at least an attempt to prevent deflation. So, MBS investors have signalled that for the medium term (3 to 10 years), that they would rather take their chances with low interest rates AND non-liquidating debt.

Will this truly end as Greenspan has put it? I will leave you with one of his most famous statements on the subject:
“But what they perceive as newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear. Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that supported higher prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low risk premiums.“

• Mean Reversion , Speculation , Debt , Deflation
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Chuck Ponzi March 4th, 2008

Rarely does the Chuck Ponzi Law of Unintended Consequences have such colorful supporters being quoted in Bloomberg.  Yesterday, Fed Chief Ben Bernanke suggested in a speech to bankers that the best option might be to reduce loan balances rather than pursuing legal foreclosures.

Remember, I stated:

The other is the physics of a forgiveness. Like Newton’s third law of physics, for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. If Banks believe that they can lose up to 20 or 30% of the value of a home, they will begin to require borrowers to “self insure” by raising collateral requirements to mitigate their new risk. They will also likely offset the risk through higher risk spreads translating to substantially higher rates with stricter requirements for credit worthiness.

Bloomberg quoted the following:

We could not imagine that the policy response would be to pour napalm on the fire,” said Julian Mann, who helps manage $3.4 billion of bonds at First Pacific Advisors LLC. “I’m going to demand higher and higher rates” to buy mortgage debt if the collateral is altered, he said.

Go Julian.

BTW, banks will get their pound of flesh one way or the other.  The only thing left is for the government to start making housing payments for people.  I’d like a little of that action.  My rent is breaking me here in OC.  I’d also like to take a heloc out against my rental, go to Hawaii, buy a Hummer like my a-hole neighbor and have it paid off by the other taxpayers too.  Only, I realized that as a renter, I pay higher taxes anyway… D’Oh.

I guess the only logical conclusion left is to revert to anarchy if that happens.  I’ve been looking around for a good MAK90 like I used to have in college.  It’s hard to believe how much they’ve gone up in recent years.  Good ole Chinese manufacturing practices.

• Lending Standards , Debt , Lizard Brain , Unintended Consequences
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Chuck Ponzi February 4th, 2008

There is a lot being tossed around about the stimulus package that is being shuttled through the house and senate. One of the proposed amendments is the slackening of the conforming limits, especially in an area of high housing prices. Most other bubble bloggers have stood against this, dismissing it as another affordability enhancing intended vehicle that will only keep prices above what a normal buyer should be able to afford. I’m going to break from that camp for the following reasons:

1. I feel that a seemingly arbitrary limit of access to credit imposed based on a nationwide median price is unfitting for high-cost and high-income regional areas.

2. Affordability is the issue, and indeed, I feel it should be addressed. I would rather see a local median-income based payment cap, along with mandated dti (debt to income) ratios.

3. Even by expanding the current set of available products won’t help the already under water homeowners, nor does it change the economics of the rent/buy equation.  Basically, it has little or no impact to the bubble.  If you can rent long-term in a high-priced area, why shouldn’t you have access to credit?

4.  The bubble was created by speculation and “affordability products”.  While nothing occurs in a vacuum, the bubble is not going to be reinflated without new affordability products and lax lending standards; something that is not going to happen in this environment.

5.  Indeed, I believe that like many speculators caught up in the positive frenzy of the real estate market, it is easy to be caught up in the pessimistic view as it tumbles.  One sign of the bottom is when everyone agrees that the product is no longer worthy of investment, and to be shunned.  We still have a long way to go, but there is no reason to overblow the risks and rewards.

In the end, creating more access to credit does not translate into overpriced homes.  Most of the problems created have already been solved in the debt market; a return to sane underwriting is already underway.  The pricing of housing is inconceivably out of whack, but will plummet for the next 2 or 3 years as the imbalances are worked out.

Besides, the current jumbo market is in disarray, adding sane underwriting to that market while not increasing the GSE’s limits can provide competitive air to the otherwise broken market.

This is not to say that it won’t have its faults… with a limited amount of funding going on, the GSEs will likely need to ration the available funds.  Price, however, is most often the best rationing device one can create.  Any way you look at it, the bubble has burst, nothing will change that.  In case you haven’t noticed, I’m not left-leaning that I believe everyone should be able to afford a house.  For many people, they have no propensity to be natural caretakers for an asset as costly and long-term as owning real estate.  Many of those people are already in homes they can barely afford, or worse, dashing their credit on the rocks of the “American Dream”; which up until 30 years ago was about starting their own business and succeeding financially, not owning a home.  Consider how far we have strayed from the path of free enterprise.

• Lending Standards , Speculation , Debt
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Chuck Ponzi October 28th, 2007

I have to admit, one of my guilty pleasures is both listening to Peter Schiff and following his advice. His theories have given my portfolio a great push forward. This is a great example of taking on the domestic bull in relationship to our declining dollar. There will be a time to buy USD again, but that time is not now.

I believe a lot of that timing will come from Bernanke’s will to crush the housing bubble. If he doesn’t, it’ll be a long time before we can get well again. We need to take the tough medicine.

• Mean Reversion , Credit Bubble , Debt , Housing Crash , Inflation
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Chuck Ponzi October 8th, 2007

Some longer time readers will remember a post that I made back in April of this year titled “Chuck Ponzi’s Law of Unintended Consequences“.  That post detailed the bail-out idea du jour… foreclosure moratoriums.

I always enjoy a discussion of how the mortgage mess that we find ourselves in can be “fixed” by using nontraditional methods.  For each of the parties arguing the solution, it often involves directly benefitting them, while the cost is to be borne by another group… “the marks”.

Mike Shedlock’s analysis of the CRL (Center for Responsible Lending) and FDIC’s proposed solutions is particluarly interesting.  His post is properly titled “The Debt Slave Act of 2005 Revisted“, which makes perfect sense considering how consumers have effectively been cut off from the one chance to make a clean break after devastating financial problems.  Instead, the newer law attempts to weed out deadbeat habitual spendthrifts from performing frequent and repeated filings to wipe the board clean every few years.  Instead, it has made it difficult enough to file bankruptcy that there is little to no possible way out.  In addition, with pledges to repay, many become debt slaves to past problems, unable to leave them in the past.

Don’t get me wrong, I’m definitely for personal responsibility in life, perhaps even too much; but the law as it currently stands puts a burden on already destitute people.  It has served to benefit lenders most of all.  So, it is with some twisted satisfaction that I read what Mish has to say on the matter… all of with which I agree.

First, he quotes a CNN Money article (shortened excerpt)

One consumer group estimates that 600,000 foreclosures could be avoided over the next two years by making a simple change to the bankruptcy code.

The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) calls it a tweak, but it could be a significant change for homeowners and the market for mortgage-backed securities.
CRL’s proposal - reflected in a House bill recently introduced - would make changes to the regulations for Chapter 13 bankruptcies, which don’t wipe out debts, but rather establish a repayment plan.

Under current law, when a person files for Ch. 13 bankruptcy, judges cannot reduce mortgage debt owed on a person’s primary residence, although they may modify mortgages on investment property or second homes.

Under the House bill, the bankruptcy judge would have the option of reducing what the homeowner owes the lender. Say a homeowner’s property is worth less than what he owes. The judge could reduce the principal to match the home’s current market value as well as reduce the loan’s interest rate.

Mish also quotes the FDIC’s proposal:

The heat on U.S. mortgage lenders and servicers was turned up a few degrees this week when the country’s chief bank regulator publicly proposed that they permanently freeze interest rates on subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) for many homeowners.

“Keep it at the starter rate. Convert it into a fixed rate. Make it permanent. And get on with it,” Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair said in prepared remarks at an investor’s conference.

That solution is nearly as bizarre.

Now, before too many of my readers go off on rants considering how this is supremely unfair… consider 2 things:  first, if balances on loans can be decided in a court and lowered as a judge feels inclined, how many banks will want to loan money, and secondly consider what Mish has to say regarding “fixing” the ARMs:

It should not take a genius to figure out that if ARMs rates are “frozen” at a point where the market does not think rates should be, there simply will be no more ARMs offered. Furthermore, to cover the cost of existing ARMS, prices would rise on new fixed rate mortgages. Oddly enough, price fixing ARMs would not even help the person most at risk because that person cannot afford the teaser rate, let alone the cost of a current ARMS rate. Thus price fixing ARMs is a sure fired guaranteed way to cause a continued weakness in home prices, if not an actual out and out crash.

Which reminds me of the original Chuck Ponzi Law of Unintended Consequences:

If there is any chance that someone can get bailed out by someone else, they will, and you will have to pay for it from your own pocket.

Now, I’m considering that I have to add that while you may need to pay for it, anything other than letting the market deal with it efficiently will likely crash it anyway.  In the end, it is the same thing that my first Econ professor in college always said was the #1 rule of economics:  TNSTAAFL “There’s No Such Thing As A Free Lunch”.  No such thing.

I am willing to bet that any artificial means of attempting to “solve” the problem will only make it worse, both for the person they are trying to help, and the overall group of people.  The only people helped by the above solutions are those who have ALL of the following:

1. Long histories of repayment
2. Excellent credit scores
3. Lots of cash for a down payment, maybe up to 30 or 40% to prevent bankruptcy write-downs
4. Enough income to support purchases on fixed rates with lengthy work history.

This way, only the most qualified can purchase.  At current prices, there are likely only 1 to 2% of the people in the entire Southern California region who could fit this bill for an average home.  And, frankly, there is no way these people will live in an “average” SoCal home.  Imposing the suggested “solutions” will only serve to do three things:

• Depeen the credit crunch
• Crash the housing market
• induce a consumer-led recession, if not depression

The deeper the credit crunch, the harder and farther housing prices will have to fall to meet demand.  The harder and further prices fall, the more likely that good paying homeowners will walk away from an underwater mortgage.  More foreclosures dropping prices and deeper credit crunch will turn off MEW (Mortgage Equity Withdrawals) which is what has been keeping the consumer (along with their credit cards) in clothes, vacations, and Plasma TV’s.  A crumbled consumer is a crumbled economy.

When the service on debt becomes more than the income, defaults are certain.  Since US wages have been in real decline (against inflation), and the US dollar in severe decline, the loss of purchasing power has become an unbelievable crush.  Anyone who has not felt and seen the substantial inflation over the past 2 years has either been asleep or dead.  Even high-end wage earners have felt the sting of higher prices.

All of this leaves me very pessimistic about the local economy that has been so built on the fortunes of real estate.  I fear we may have much, much worse things ahead of us compared with the past few months.

• Mean Reversion , Credit Bubble , Debt , Housing Crash , Inflation
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Chuck Ponzi August 6th, 2007

The action around MBS’s and other derivatives related to the housing market reminds me of an often quoted speech given by Alan Greenspan.

“This vast increase in the market value of asset claims is in part the indirect result of investors accepting lower compensation for risk. Such an increase in market value is too often viewed by market participants as structural and permanent… But what they perceive as newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear. Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that supported higher asset prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low-risk premiums.”

While he didn’t do enough to prevent asset bubble from forming, at least he understands what the aftermath does.  “newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear”.

It reminds me of a post I made back in the heady days of September 2005, Greenspan’s Interesting Clarity.  Yes, nearly 2 years of blogging ago.

Where does this lead us? Well… we’re acting a bit like the japanese in our debt lending by accepting low risk premiums, and the longer this goes on, the greater the risk to all participants, lenders and borrowers. If liquidity were to be suddenly shored up by investors demanding a greater return for thier risk, or if percieved risk were to suddenly jump, borrowing would become much more difficult for buyers. Interest rates will increase accordingly. Even established buyers might not be able to purchase homes due to restricted risk premiums; all of which will only serve to slow the real estate market and put the power of purchasing into well qualified buyers.

It has been my assertion that the housing bubble was caused not by low interest rates, but by excess liquidity that banks could only farm out by lowering lending standards. It was this easy credit that was extended to a whole set of the population that had never before been entrusted with credit; this caused “neverending” demand. Much like college students that max out their first credit card, only to find that the payments exceed their income, many of today’s buyers will be unable to make payments in the future.

Our little “deflationary concern” may soon turn into a financial meltdown since problems tend to spiral: Increases of forced sales trigger lower prices, which triggers lower spending and more foreclosures; lower spending triggers more layoffs; foreclosures trigger financial losses for banks and MBS holders; financial losses triggers less liquidity; less liquidity triggers higher interest rates; which triggers more defaults on ARMs and HELOCs… the list of effects could go on forever. Our economy is increasingly dependent on house price appreciation, but 2 things keep these trees from growing to the sky.
1. Credit has limits, since some risk premium must be attached to borrowing money, and interest must be charged. Investor sentiment is everything here.
2. Even a leveling off will decrease construction jobs that will kick-off the above process, so increasing growth is necessary to keep the merry-go-round going.

As you can see, it is easier to predict WHAT is going to happen, opposed to WHEN it is going to happen.  It was surprising to me that the housing boom ended with a consumer-led paring back of purchases, as I had expected the lending environment to tighten considerably before it did.  What this likely means is that while it postphoned the inevitable crash, it will likely only amplify the severity of the downturn.  As they say, the bigger they are, the harder they fall.

However, not trying to be a Monday morning quarterback, but had the FED raised rates twice more as I had hoped they would, they would have had an additional half-point lowering room when the credit event happened.  The fact that they did not either says that they did not understand the extent of the credit market’s problems and attendant risk mongering, or they simply believed (and perhaps still do) believe that the credit markets can self-correct without affecting unemployment, or currency attractiveness.  It may be that with the weakness exhibited by the currency, Ben B. should likely be raising rates when the world is calling for cutting them.  It’s always easier to get out in front of the problem than cleaning up after the mess, but when has the Federal reserve done that since Paul Volker?

• Psychology , Credit Bubble , Lending Standards , Debt
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Chuck Ponzi July 19th, 2007

From Reuters:

In the first quarter of this year, roughly one of every 41 subprime loans was entering foreclosure, and more than one of every six were delinquent, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. Those are the worst mortgage default statistics since the Great Depression. And it’s likely to get worse because the 2006 crop of mortgages, which will start resetting next year, were of a particularly low quality. Many carry prepayment penalties and could reset by as much as 5 percentage points when they do adjust.

Good thing it’s “contained”, right?

• Credit Bubble , Debt
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Chuck Ponzi May 11th, 2007

It seems that consumers have been takign a few months off.

Bad Weather, unseasonably good weather, or just the housing slump.

Either way, consumers are pretty much maxed out, as Market Watch tells us. None of this is surprising in light of the ongoing credit contraction and reduction of MEWs going on in the credit markets.

I highly recommend a good read of Barry Ritholtz’s take on “Retail Sales = Hard Landing?”

One of the early casualties of the downturn is Tweeter Home Entertainment who yesterday announced a possible bankruptcy filing and whose stock has dropped from over $8 to currently trading at $.35 over the past year. I surmise we haven’t seen the last of retail pain in this recession.

• Credit Bubble , Debt
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