Rarely does the Chuck Ponzi Law of Unintended Consequences have such colorful supporters being quoted in Bloomberg.  Yesterday, Fed Chief Ben Bernanke suggested in a speech to bankers that the best option might be to reduce loan balances rather than pursuing legal foreclosures.

Remember, I stated:

The other is the physics of a forgiveness. Like Newton’s third law of physics, for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. If Banks believe that they can lose up to 20 or 30% of the value of a home, they will begin to require borrowers to “self insure” by raising collateral requirements to mitigate their new risk. They will also likely offset the risk through higher risk spreads translating to substantially higher rates with stricter requirements for credit worthiness.

Bloomberg quoted the following:

We could not imagine that the policy response would be to pour napalm on the fire,” said Julian Mann, who helps manage $3.4 billion of bonds at First Pacific Advisors LLC. “I’m going to demand higher and higher rates” to buy mortgage debt if the collateral is altered, he said.

Go Julian.

BTW, banks will get their pound of flesh one way or the other.  The only thing left is for the government to start making housing payments for people.  I’d like a little of that action.  My rent is breaking me here in OC.  I’d also like to take a heloc out against my rental, go to Hawaii, buy a Hummer like my a-hole neighbor and have it paid off by the other taxpayers too.  Only, I realized that as a renter, I pay higher taxes anyway… D’Oh.

I guess the only logical conclusion left is to revert to anarchy if that happens.  I’ve been looking around for a good MAK90 like I used to have in college.  It’s hard to believe how much they’ve gone up in recent years.  Good ole Chinese manufacturing practices.

 

There is a lot being tossed around about the stimulus package that is being shuttled through the house and senate. One of the proposed amendments is the slackening of the conforming limits, especially in an area of high housing prices. Most other bubble bloggers have stood against this, dismissing it as another affordability enhancing intended vehicle that will only keep prices above what a normal buyer should be able to afford. I’m going to break from that camp for the following reasons:

1. I feel that a seemingly arbitrary limit of access to credit imposed based on a nationwide median price is unfitting for high-cost and high-income regional areas.

2. Affordability is the issue, and indeed, I feel it should be addressed. I would rather see a local median-income based payment cap, along with mandated dti (debt to income) ratios.

3. Even by expanding the current set of available products won’t help the already under water homeowners, nor does it change the economics of the rent/buy equation.  Basically, it has little or no impact to the bubble.  If you can rent long-term in a high-priced area, why shouldn’t you have access to credit?

4.  The bubble was created by speculation and “affordability products”.  While nothing occurs in a vacuum, the bubble is not going to be reinflated without new affordability products and lax lending standards; something that is not going to happen in this environment.

5.  Indeed, I believe that like many speculators caught up in the positive frenzy of the real estate market, it is easy to be caught up in the pessimistic view as it tumbles.  One sign of the bottom is when everyone agrees that the product is no longer worthy of investment, and to be shunned.  We still have a long way to go, but there is no reason to overblow the risks and rewards.

In the end, creating more access to credit does not translate into overpriced homes.  Most of the problems created have already been solved in the debt market; a return to sane underwriting is already underway.  The pricing of housing is inconceivably out of whack, but will plummet for the next 2 or 3 years as the imbalances are worked out.

Besides, the current jumbo market is in disarray, adding sane underwriting to that market while not increasing the GSE’s limits can provide competitive air to the otherwise broken market.

This is not to say that it won’t have its faults… with a limited amount of funding going on, the GSEs will likely need to ration the available funds.  Price, however, is most often the best rationing device one can create.  Any way you look at it, the bubble has burst, nothing will change that.  In case you haven’t noticed, I’m not left-leaning that I believe everyone should be able to afford a house.  For many people, they have no propensity to be natural caretakers for an asset as costly and long-term as owning real estate.  Many of those people are already in homes they can barely afford, or worse, dashing their credit on the rocks of the “American Dream”; which up until 30 years ago was about starting their own business and succeeding financially, not owning a home.  Consider how far we have strayed from the path of free enterprise.

 

I have to admit, one of my guilty pleasures is both listening to Peter Schiff and following his advice. His theories have given my portfolio a great push forward. This is a great example of taking on the domestic bull in relationship to our declining dollar. There will be a time to buy USD again, but that time is not now.

I believe a lot of that timing will come from Bernanke’s will to crush the housing bubble. If he doesn’t, it’ll be a long time before we can get well again. We need to take the tough medicine.

 

Some longer time readers will remember a post that I made back in April of this year titled “Chuck Ponzi’s Law of Unintended Consequences“.  That post detailed the bail-out idea du jour… foreclosure moratoriums.

I always enjoy a discussion of how the mortgage mess that we find ourselves in can be “fixed” by using nontraditional methods.  For each of the parties arguing the solution, it often involves directly benefitting them, while the cost is to be borne by another group… “the marks”.

Mike Shedlock’s analysis of the CRL (Center for Responsible Lending) and FDIC’s proposed solutions is particluarly interesting.  His post is properly titled “The Debt Slave Act of 2005 Revisted“, which makes perfect sense considering how consumers have effectively been cut off from the one chance to make a clean break after devastating financial problems.  Instead, the newer law attempts to weed out deadbeat habitual spendthrifts from performing frequent and repeated filings to wipe the board clean every few years.  Instead, it has made it difficult enough to file bankruptcy that there is little to no possible way out.  In addition, with pledges to repay, many become debt slaves to past problems, unable to leave them in the past.

Don’t get me wrong, I’m definitely for personal responsibility in life, perhaps even too much; but the law as it currently stands puts a burden on already destitute people.  It has served to benefit lenders most of all.  So, it is with some twisted satisfaction that I read what Mish has to say on the matter… all of with which I agree.

First, he quotes a CNN Money article (shortened excerpt)

One consumer group estimates that 600,000 foreclosures could be avoided over the next two years by making a simple change to the bankruptcy code.

The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) calls it a tweak, but it could be a significant change for homeowners and the market for mortgage-backed securities.
CRL’s proposal – reflected in a House bill recently introduced – would make changes to the regulations for Chapter 13 bankruptcies, which don’t wipe out debts, but rather establish a repayment plan.

Under current law, when a person files for Ch. 13 bankruptcy, judges cannot reduce mortgage debt owed on a person’s primary residence, although they may modify mortgages on investment property or second homes.

Under the House bill, the bankruptcy judge would have the option of reducing what the homeowner owes the lender. Say a homeowner’s property is worth less than what he owes. The judge could reduce the principal to match the home’s current market value as well as reduce the loan’s interest rate.

Mish also quotes the FDIC’s proposal:

The heat on U.S. mortgage lenders and servicers was turned up a few degrees this week when the country’s chief bank regulator publicly proposed that they permanently freeze interest rates on subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) for many homeowners.

“Keep it at the starter rate. Convert it into a fixed rate. Make it permanent. And get on with it,” Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair said in prepared remarks at an investor’s conference.

That solution is nearly as bizarre.

Now, before too many of my readers go off on rants considering how this is supremely unfair… consider 2 things:  first, if balances on loans can be decided in a court and lowered as a judge feels inclined, how many banks will want to loan money, and secondly consider what Mish has to say regarding “fixing” the ARMs:

It should not take a genius to figure out that if ARMs rates are “frozen” at a point where the market does not think rates should be, there simply will be no more ARMs offered. Furthermore, to cover the cost of existing ARMS, prices would rise on new fixed rate mortgages. Oddly enough, price fixing ARMs would not even help the person most at risk because that person cannot afford the teaser rate, let alone the cost of a current ARMS rate. Thus price fixing ARMs is a sure fired guaranteed way to cause a continued weakness in home prices, if not an actual out and out crash.

Which reminds me of the original Chuck Ponzi Law of Unintended Consequences:

If there is any chance that someone can get bailed out by someone else, they will, and you will have to pay for it from your own pocket.

Now, I’m considering that I have to add that while you may need to pay for it, anything other than letting the market deal with it efficiently will likely crash it anyway.  In the end, it is the same thing that my first Econ professor in college always said was the #1 rule of economics:  TNSTAAFL “There’s No Such Thing As A Free Lunch”.  No such thing.

I am willing to bet that any artificial means of attempting to “solve” the problem will only make it worse, both for the person they are trying to help, and the overall group of people.  The only people helped by the above solutions are those who have ALL of the following:

  1. Long histories of repayment
  2. Excellent credit scores
  3. Lots of cash for a down payment, maybe up to 30 or 40% to prevent bankruptcy write-downs
  4. Enough income to support purchases on fixed rates with lengthy work history.

This way, only the most qualified can purchase.  At current prices, there are likely only 1 to 2% of the people in the entire Southern California region who could fit this bill for an average home.  And, frankly, there is no way these people will live in an “average” SoCal home.  Imposing the suggested “solutions” will only serve to do three things:

  • Depeen the credit crunch
  • Crash the housing market
  • induce a consumer-led recession, if not depression

The deeper the credit crunch, the harder and farther housing prices will have to fall to meet demand.  The harder and further prices fall, the more likely that good paying homeowners will walk away from an underwater mortgage.  More foreclosures dropping prices and deeper credit crunch will turn off MEW (Mortgage Equity Withdrawals) which is what has been keeping the consumer (along with their credit cards) in clothes, vacations, and Plasma TV’s.  A crumbled consumer is a crumbled economy.

When the service on debt becomes more than the income, defaults are certain.  Since US wages have been in real decline (against inflation), and the US dollar in severe decline, the loss of purchasing power has become an unbelievable crush.  Anyone who has not felt and seen the substantial inflation over the past 2 years has either been asleep or dead.  Even high-end wage earners have felt the sting of higher prices.

All of this leaves me very pessimistic about the local economy that has been so built on the fortunes of real estate.  I fear we may have much, much worse things ahead of us compared with the past few months.

 

The action around MBS’s and other derivatives related to the housing market reminds me of an often quoted speech given by Alan Greenspan.

“This vast increase in the market value of asset claims is in part the indirect result of investors accepting lower compensation for risk. Such an increase in market value is too often viewed by market participants as structural and permanent… But what they perceive as newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear. Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that supported higher asset prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low-risk premiums.”

While he didn’t do enough to prevent asset bubble from forming, at least he understands what the aftermath does.  “newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear”.

It reminds me of a post I made back in the heady days of September 2005, Greenspan’s Interesting Clarity.  Yes, nearly 2 years of blogging ago.

Where does this lead us? Well… we’re acting a bit like the japanese in our debt lending by accepting low risk premiums, and the longer this goes on, the greater the risk to all participants, lenders and borrowers. If liquidity were to be suddenly shored up by investors demanding a greater return for thier risk, or if percieved risk were to suddenly jump, borrowing would become much more difficult for buyers. Interest rates will increase accordingly. Even established buyers might not be able to purchase homes due to restricted risk premiums; all of which will only serve to slow the real estate market and put the power of purchasing into well qualified buyers.

It has been my assertion that the housing bubble was caused not by low interest rates, but by excess liquidity that banks could only farm out by lowering lending standards. It was this easy credit that was extended to a whole set of the population that had never before been entrusted with credit; this caused “neverending” demand. Much like college students that max out their first credit card, only to find that the payments exceed their income, many of today’s buyers will be unable to make payments in the future.

Our little “deflationary concern” may soon turn into a financial meltdown since problems tend to spiral: Increases of forced sales trigger lower prices, which triggers lower spending and more foreclosures; lower spending triggers more layoffs; foreclosures trigger financial losses for banks and MBS holders; financial losses triggers less liquidity; less liquidity triggers higher interest rates; which triggers more defaults on ARMs and HELOCs… the list of effects could go on forever. Our economy is increasingly dependent on house price appreciation, but 2 things keep these trees from growing to the sky.
1. Credit has limits, since some risk premium must be attached to borrowing money, and interest must be charged. Investor sentiment is everything here.
2. Even a leveling off will decrease construction jobs that will kick-off the above process, so increasing growth is necessary to keep the merry-go-round going.

As you can see, it is easier to predict WHAT is going to happen, opposed to WHEN it is going to happen.  It was surprising to me that the housing boom ended with a consumer-led paring back of purchases, as I had expected the lending environment to tighten considerably before it did.  What this likely means is that while it postphoned the inevitable crash, it will likely only amplify the severity of the downturn.  As they say, the bigger they are, the harder they fall.

However, not trying to be a Monday morning quarterback, but had the FED raised rates twice more as I had hoped they would, they would have had an additional half-point lowering room when the credit event happened.  The fact that they did not either says that they did not understand the extent of the credit market’s problems and attendant risk mongering, or they simply believed (and perhaps still do) believe that the credit markets can self-correct without affecting unemployment, or currency attractiveness.  It may be that with the weakness exhibited by the currency, Ben B. should likely be raising rates when the world is calling for cutting them.  It’s always easier to get out in front of the problem than cleaning up after the mess, but when has the Federal reserve done that since Paul Volker?

 

From Reuters:

In the first quarter of this year, roughly one of every 41 subprime loans was entering foreclosure, and more than one of every six were delinquent, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. Those are the worst mortgage default statistics since the Great Depression. And it’s likely to get worse because the 2006 crop of mortgages, which will start resetting next year, were of a particularly low quality. Many carry prepayment penalties and could reset by as much as 5 percentage points when they do adjust.

Good thing it’s “contained”, right?

 

Indefatigable Consumers?

It seems that consumers have been takign a few months off.

Bad Weather, unseasonably good weather, or just the housing slump.

Either way, consumers are pretty much maxed out, as Market Watch tells us. None of this is surprising in light of the ongoing credit contraction and reduction of MEWs going on in the credit markets.

I highly recommend a good read of Barry Ritholtz’s take on “Retail Sales = Hard Landing?”

One of the early casualties of the downturn is Tweeter Home Entertainment who yesterday announced a possible bankruptcy filing and whose stock has dropped from over $8 to currently trading at $.35 over the past year. I surmise we haven’t seen the last of retail pain in this recession.

 

OK, the jokes can now officially begin.

New Century is now Old Century and some such garbage.

New Century announced that 2000. Yes, 2000 employees will be severed tomorrow (no, not their limbs, just their jobs).

From Forbes:

Financially strapped subprime mortgage lender New Century Financial Corp., failed to receive any bids for its mortgage loan origination business, forcing it to shut down the unit and lay off around 2,000 employees, the company told employees Thursday.

The Irvine-based company, which has been preparing to sell off its assets under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection since last month, notified employees during a conference call that they would be laid off effective Friday.

Speaking on the call, New Century President and Chief Executive Brad A. Morrice said despite a number of potential buyers for its wholesale and consumer-direct operations, “none of those potential deals have come to pass.”

Just who those original “suitors” were remains a mystery to the outsiders. I remember clearly the day that it was announced that 6 companies had thrown their hats into the ring. I guess there was a realization that little to no value remained in that portion of the business. Of course, not all is lost, the servicing arm has already lined up buyers.

It’s good to take a look back at how hopeful that really was. Irrational Exuberance?

Interestingly, last night, my wife made me watch American Idol. One of the departing contestants (I don’t know or remember who) sang the Bon Jovi hit “Blaze of Glory”.

Therefore, I dedicate this video to New Century:

No I aint looking for forgiveness
But before I’m six foot deep
Lord, I got to ask a favor
And I’ll hope you’ll understand
cause Ive lived life to the fullest
Let the boy die like a man
Staring down the bullet
Let me make my final stand

 

Let the Credit Crunch Begin

This morning, Bloomberg tells us that Credit Suisse is being sued by buyers of subprime loans packaged as bonds. This is the next step in our evolution of the credit crunch. With the housing bubble still chugging away on the fumes of credit, the only thing left is to clamp off the funding entirely and kill the beast off through starvation.

The suit, filed in Florida by Bankers Life Insurance Co., is “one of three to five in the pipeline” involving securitizations by Credit Suisse, Switzerland’s second-largest bank, said Dale Ledbetter of Ledbetter & Associates P.A., one of two law firms representing the Bankers Financial Corp. unit.

“We suspect that once people understand what occurred here, there’s going to be a lot more,” Ledbetter said. A total of $302.6 million of bonds were originally issued in the deal.

I concur. Once people understand the implications, the flood of lawsuits will make even the security packagers wary to get involved. Nothing like a little risk in the system to flush out the bad blood.

What are the charges?

Credit Suisse units caused Bankers Life to lose money by overstating how much of losses after foreclosures on the loans insurance would cover; accepting “shoddy, inferior” loans; failing to buy back fraudulent ones; and covering up delinquencies, according to a complaint filed April 23 in Tampa. Payments were being advanced on borrowers’ behalf to “maintain the illusion” defaults weren’t occurring, Bankers Life claims.

Whoah. If true, noone will touch a Credit Suisse bank with a 10 foot pole. Those are some heavy accusations of outright fraud for a company whose livelihood is based on trust in their products.

The natural question asked would be… but Chuck, haven’t you been telling us all along that many of these securities are sold with default insurance when they are packaged? I mean, insurance companies are willing to accept lower returns as long as it is guaranteed, after all state insurance commissions won’t allow risky investments, right?

Good point, readers, except in this case, the insurer denied the claim. Didn’t think that could happen? Think again:

Triad, which provided both loan and pool insurance, failed to pay claims for default loans because it claimed they were fraudulent, without responding to Bankers Life’s requests for more information, the complaint said. Bank of New York failed to report when the claims weren’t being paid, Bankers Life says.

The insurer also claims Credit Suisse misrepresented that the loans were from “highly credible financial institutions” when they were made by smaller lenders; put adjustable-rate loans in pools that borrowers couldn’t later afford; and didn’t pursue foreclosures and insurance claims appropriately.

The next question is the best… will we see any cross-defaults when more of these surface? If so, hold on for the financial ride of a lifetime… it’s gonna be a doozy.

 

With recent talk from Senator Dodd about a bailout for the “little man”,  we’re left to ponder who a bailout would really help or hurt, who pays, and who benefits from it.

Luckily, the guys over at Wharton (which, surprisingly have more credibility than some anonymous guy with a blog) have given the media world some soundbites to play over and over again.

We began speaking of Moral Hazard once the downturn started.  When you fix someone else’s problem, you create an incentive for that person to do the thing that caused the problem… they’ll just get bailed out again.

From Wharton’s school of Business:

“I think that for the moment, they should probably leave it alone,” says Joseph Gyourko, professor of real estate and finance at Wharton, warning that bailouts can make people more reckless in the future. “We don’t want to introduce moral hazard …. We don’t understand this very well right now, so any regulation is probably going to be wrong or imprecise.”

In fact, he says, the market is already correcting the problem. Lenders have dramatically cut their offerings of the most hazardous products –such as loans that require no down payment or proof of the borrower’s income, or those which allow borrowers to decide for themselves how much to pay each month.

Ken Thomas, a lecturer on finance at Wharton, argues that people and institutions that make risky choices are usually best left to suffer the consequences. “When we had the last big financial meltdown with stocks in 2001, did we consider bailing out those who lost money in the dot-com crash?” he asks. “We try to have markets regulate, not the government. Markets do a much better job.”

What we are seeing right now is that the markets are reacting to better information than they previously had.  Like Newton’s 3rd law of motion:  For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.  In Economics, we say “There’s No Such Thing As A Free Lunch”

Besides, who would a bailout help?  Certainly not homeowners.  How could you weed out who where truly in trouble, and who were opportunists?  Wouldn’t that saving create a need that you would later need to feed?  What about my free lunch too?  Would I (as a taxpayer) need to pay for someone else’s indiscretion?  What about the money I lost in the stock market in 2001, can I get a refund there too?   For those subprime homeowners… many of them came to the table with bad credit and no cash.  So, they’re leaving with bad credit and no cash, is their life that much worse off, and is that our collective problem that they cannot manage money?

On the other hand, lenders wouldn’t lose a penny.  They were the ones who recklessly took risks and offered the loans to the higher credit risk for a higher return.  A bailout would only serve to line their pockets for taking outsized risks.  There’s a reason that it’s called risk in the first place.

Dodd, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, plans to introduce legislation to protect homeowners from foreclosure and to crack down on predatory lenders who pushed high-risk loans on unsuspecting borrowers. Clinton is pushing for a federally mandated “foreclosure timeout” that would give homeowners more time to catch up on their payments, and she wants to curtail the prepayment penalties that make it hard for troubled borrowers to refinance. The National Community Reinvestment Coalition wants the Federal Housing Administration to be given new power to refinance subprime borrowers’ loans, and it wants the federal government to set up a fund for rescuing low-income homeowners.

Senator Dodd, you are treading on thin ice.  Be careful where you step.  The next one could be the wrong one.  Nothing like a good scandal to end one’s political career.  We all know you’re in bed with the financing organizations… all it takes is one false step.