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Not So Many Courters After All

Chuck Ponzi May 3rd, 2007

OK, the jokes can now officially begin.

New Century is now Old Century and some such garbage.

New Century announced that 2000. Yes, 2000 employees will be severed tomorrow (no, not their limbs, just their jobs).

From Forbes:

Financially strapped subprime mortgage lender New Century Financial Corp., failed to receive any bids for its mortgage loan origination business, forcing it to shut down the unit and lay off around 2,000 employees, the company told employees Thursday.

The Irvine-based company, which has been preparing to sell off its assets under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection since last month, notified employees during a conference call that they would be laid off effective Friday.

Speaking on the call, New Century President and Chief Executive Brad A. Morrice said despite a number of potential buyers for its wholesale and consumer-direct operations, “none of those potential deals have come to pass.”

Just who those original “suitors” were remains a mystery to the outsiders. I remember clearly the day that it was announced that 6 companies had thrown their hats into the ring. I guess there was a realization that little to no value remained in that portion of the business. Of course, not all is lost, the servicing arm has already lined up buyers.

It’s good to take a look back at how hopeful that really was. Irrational Exuberance?

Interestingly, last night, my wife made me watch American Idol. One of the departing contestants (I don’t know or remember who) sang the Bon Jovi hit “Blaze of Glory”.

Therefore, I dedicate this video to New Century:

No I aint looking for forgiveness
But before I’m six foot deep
Lord, I got to ask a favor
And I’ll hope you’ll understand
cause Ive lived life to the fullest
Let the boy die like a man
Staring down the bullet
Let me make my final stand

Let the Credit Crunch Begin

Chuck Ponzi April 30th, 2007

This morning, Bloomberg tells us that Credit Suisse is being sued by buyers of subprime loans packaged as bonds. This is the next step in our evolution of the credit crunch. With the housing bubble still chugging away on the fumes of credit, the only thing left is to clamp off the funding entirely and kill the beast off through starvation.

The suit, filed in Florida by Bankers Life Insurance Co., is “one of three to five in the pipeline” involving securitizations by Credit Suisse, Switzerland’s second-largest bank, said Dale Ledbetter of Ledbetter & Associates P.A., one of two law firms representing the Bankers Financial Corp. unit.

“We suspect that once people understand what occurred here, there’s going to be a lot more,” Ledbetter said. A total of $302.6 million of bonds were originally issued in the deal.

I concur. Once people understand the implications, the flood of lawsuits will make even the security packagers wary to get involved. Nothing like a little risk in the system to flush out the bad blood.

What are the charges?

Credit Suisse units caused Bankers Life to lose money by overstating how much of losses after foreclosures on the loans insurance would cover; accepting “shoddy, inferior” loans; failing to buy back fraudulent ones; and covering up delinquencies, according to a complaint filed April 23 in Tampa. Payments were being advanced on borrowers’ behalf to “maintain the illusion” defaults weren’t occurring, Bankers Life claims.

Whoah. If true, noone will touch a Credit Suisse bank with a 10 foot pole. Those are some heavy accusations of outright fraud for a company whose livelihood is based on trust in their products.

The natural question asked would be… but Chuck, haven’t you been telling us all along that many of these securities are sold with default insurance when they are packaged? I mean, insurance companies are willing to accept lower returns as long as it is guaranteed, after all state insurance commissions won’t allow risky investments, right?

Good point, readers, except in this case, the insurer denied the claim. Didn’t think that could happen? Think again:

Triad, which provided both loan and pool insurance, failed to pay claims for default loans because it claimed they were fraudulent, without responding to Bankers Life’s requests for more information, the complaint said. Bank of New York failed to report when the claims weren’t being paid, Bankers Life says.

The insurer also claims Credit Suisse misrepresented that the loans were from “highly credible financial institutions” when they were made by smaller lenders; put adjustable-rate loans in pools that borrowers couldn’t later afford; and didn’t pursue foreclosures and insurance claims appropriately.

The next question is the best… will we see any cross-defaults when more of these surface? If so, hold on for the financial ride of a lifetime… it’s gonna be a doozy.

“Bailouts can make people more reckless in the future”

Chuck Ponzi March 28th, 2007

With recent talk from Senator Dodd about a bailout for the “little man”,  we’re left to ponder who a bailout would really help or hurt, who pays, and who benefits from it.

Luckily, the guys over at Wharton (which, surprisingly have more credibility than some anonymous guy with a blog) have given the media world some soundbites to play over and over again.

We began speaking of Moral Hazard once the downturn started.  When you fix someone else’s problem, you create an incentive for that person to do the thing that caused the problem… they’ll just get bailed out again.

From Wharton’s school of Business:

“I think that for the moment, they should probably leave it alone,” says Joseph Gyourko, professor of real estate and finance at Wharton, warning that bailouts can make people more reckless in the future. “We don’t want to introduce moral hazard …. We don’t understand this very well right now, so any regulation is probably going to be wrong or imprecise.”

In fact, he says, the market is already correcting the problem. Lenders have dramatically cut their offerings of the most hazardous products –such as loans that require no down payment or proof of the borrower’s income, or those which allow borrowers to decide for themselves how much to pay each month.

Ken Thomas, a lecturer on finance at Wharton, argues that people and institutions that make risky choices are usually best left to suffer the consequences. “When we had the last big financial meltdown with stocks in 2001, did we consider bailing out those who lost money in the dot-com crash?” he asks. “We try to have markets regulate, not the government. Markets do a much better job.”

What we are seeing right now is that the markets are reacting to better information than they previously had.  Like Newton’s 3rd law of motion:  For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.  In Economics, we say “There’s No Such Thing As A Free Lunch”

Besides, who would a bailout help?  Certainly not homeowners.  How could you weed out who where truly in trouble, and who were opportunists?  Wouldn’t that saving create a need that you would later need to feed?  What about my free lunch too?  Would I (as a taxpayer) need to pay for someone else’s indiscretion?  What about the money I lost in the stock market in 2001, can I get a refund there too?   For those subprime homeowners… many of them came to the table with bad credit and no cash.  So, they’re leaving with bad credit and no cash, is their life that much worse off, and is that our collective problem that they cannot manage money?

On the other hand, lenders wouldn’t lose a penny.  They were the ones who recklessly took risks and offered the loans to the higher credit risk for a higher return.  A bailout would only serve to line their pockets for taking outsized risks.  There’s a reason that it’s called risk in the first place.

Dodd, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, plans to introduce legislation to protect homeowners from foreclosure and to crack down on predatory lenders who pushed high-risk loans on unsuspecting borrowers. Clinton is pushing for a federally mandated “foreclosure timeout” that would give homeowners more time to catch up on their payments, and she wants to curtail the prepayment penalties that make it hard for troubled borrowers to refinance. The National Community Reinvestment Coalition wants the Federal Housing Administration to be given new power to refinance subprime borrowers’ loans, and it wants the federal government to set up a fund for rescuing low-income homeowners.

Senator Dodd, you are treading on thin ice.  Be careful where you step.  The next one could be the wrong one.  Nothing like a good scandal to end one’s political career.  We all know you’re in bed with the financing organizations… all it takes is one false step.

Twisted ARMs

Chuck Ponzi March 6th, 2007

Ever explained to someone that the housing bubble in California is just a blowoff of speculative demand, only to be rebuffed by some pseudo edumuhcashun truthiness about how so many people want to live here, blah blah blah, great weather, blah blah blah, people make a lot of money here, blah blah blah, construction costs, blah blah blah, land use restrictions, blah blah blah and so on blather?

Would you just love to stick something in their face that breaks it down scientifically and proves them all wrong?  Something that shows exactly how much these variables changed the cost of living here?  Wouldn’t you love to get your hands on exactly that piece of information?  Wouldn’t you love to prove in graphs and numbers that the variables they just mentioned had little to no effect on prices, while it was exactly the proliferation of ARMs that did it?

Wouldn’t you love that piece of work to include formulas such as this:

Function of home price appreciation variables

And written by a professor of finance at a California university? 

What if I told you that exactly such a paper exists that delves into California’s history of home prices discussion that includes a detailed explanation of what caused the home price explosion?  It does exist.

Here’s a rundown of the conclusions:

California’s Housing Bubble Explained

Well, have I whetted your appetite enough to sit through 30 minutes of mind-tearing edumuhcashun to get to the data behind the pretty little graph I pounded out?

Here it is.

Regulators “You can Do Better”

Chuck Ponzi March 2nd, 2007

Continuing the ongoing saga of the subprime implosion, Federal Regulators have gotten into the play of our Spring Smackdown by strongarming mortgage lenders into qualifying based on fully amortizing payments.

Can you say Ruh roh Shaggy?

Regulators are concerned lenders are issuing mortgages to borrowers with little proof that they can repay their loan and do not fully understand the risk of increasing payments, the document states.

Subprime borrowers could find themselves unable to afford monthly payments after the initial “teaser” rate expires and make payments for taxes and other expenses if lenders do not hold such costs in escrow, the document states.

Subprime borrowers also face the risk of “losing their home,” the document states.

That pretty much describes most of Southern California.  When our affordability dipped below 6%, and much of the wealthy already live here (we’re not attracting a higher percent of millionaires than are already here), the area’s housing will stop in its tracks if documented income were required on a fully amortizing basis.

Dead Cold.

More than 80% of the loans made recently in SoCal were of the adjustable rate ilk, and I’d venture a guess than more than just a smidgen of those are due to affordability of the monthly payment.  Fully amortizing loans are currently touted as stone age devices not worthy of a modern world.  All part of the “it’s different this time” argument that is so quickly spouted by the clueless.  Just look at history if you want to know what affordability is going to look like.  Because, frankly, if the loans of yesteryear are reintroduced, so are the prices.  Incomes have not kept up with basic inflation, much less the out-of-control prices of Southern California.

The positive to all of this speculation squashing is that it will flush homes back to banks and back on the market at reduced prices.  Individuals will lose out, but the overall will be better.  Risk will once again be priced in.

SB385 - Non Traditional Mortgage Guidance

Chuck Ponzi February 27th, 2007

Lawmakers - Founding FathersAnyone wondering when California was going to adopt the guidance for non traditional mortgages?  Not too long from now would be my assertion.

The California Senate bill SB385 has been submitted on the 21st.  We’ll see if it hits any snags… although I doubt it.

According to the Federal Reserve, the guidelines are intended to:
1.  Ensure that loan terms and underwriting standards are consistent with prudent lending practices, including consideration of a borrower’s repayment capacity;
2.  Recognize that many nontraditional mortgage loans, particularly when they have risk-layering features, are untested in a stressed environment. These products warrant strong risk management standards, capital levels commensurate with the risk, and an allowance for loan and lease losses that reflects the collectibility of the portfolio; and
3.  Ensure that consumers have sufficient information to clearly understand loan terms and associated risks prior to making a product or payment choice.

Continue Reading »

Contrarian Indicators: Business Week

Chuck Ponzi February 9th, 2007

For many perusing the site, you’ll appreciate what a strong contrarian indicator mainstream media can be. For the rest of us, the mainstream media often acts as a blubbering beaurocratic beheamoth. No offense intended, just stating the obvious.

It is for this reason that by the time ideas come to print, they are often outdated and decidedly deceptive. Just such a cover comes our way. (Hat tip and thanks to JMF of immobilienblasen, or “real-estate bubble” for non-German speakers, for bringing this to my attention)

The article “It’s A Low, Low, Low, Low-Rate World: Money is cheap. And some experts say it could stay that way for years. That’s creating opportunity—and brand new risks” is here.

This is the cover of the current issue of Business Week:
How accurate you might ask, has the mainstream media been in predicting so far in the housing bubble? Consider, for example, the cheerleading piece Time magazine published in June 2005, at the near exact top of the housing bubble:
Not surprisingly, when you go to BusinessWeeks homepage, you’ll see this little one (the arrows are mine)
If you don’t see the irony in how the 2 issues impact each other, here it is:
1. Rates are low and credit available because there is low percieved risk. Risk is perceived as low because housing prices were rising.
2. Housing prices are supported by low rates and available credit. If rates go up, housing prices will go down. They are “priced to perfection”

Reminds me of something Alan Greenspan said:

Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that supported higher asset prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low-risk premiums.

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