Chuck Ponzi March 8th, 2010

One of the most powerful experiences that investment bubbles can teach us collectively is how conservative we should  be when burned multiple times.  Unfortunately, for many of those newly exiting business schools or unaffected by a downturn show an uncanny ability to ignore others’ experiences.  The most powerful lessons of this past “lost decade” in the US (if we will but open our eyes to learn it) is that outsized returns cannot be depended on, and that risk does not equal reward, it just means risk.

CALPERS, the California Public Retirement Pension fund is about to learn that lesson the hard way. Formed in the 30’s, but built on the back of the 50s through the 80’s, it’s investment options expanded from solely bonds to real estate, to equities.  During this time, America experienced the greatest growth of real estate, equity, and bond values.  But most of all, of leverage.  Sadly, most of the value “growth” in the US over the past 20 or so years has been attributed directly to monetary growth.  Indeed, as yields on lower risk returns shrink, perception of higher risk equity values go up.  Unfortunately, for many, this mirage has much more power, and this perception that trees grow to the sky and all charts go up and to the right meant that there was little risk in promising free healthcare and pensions to the moon for all who worked for the grand state of California.

Except that it can’t.  The high profile failure of CALPERS has been nothing short of stunning.  Having lost more than 30% of its total value in 2008, it is unclear how the future promises made to state employees can be filled.  Especially when those promises are built on expectations that returns are 7.75% over the long run.

SFGate recently reported that they are considering lowering their benchmark rate above.  As reported:

Larry Fink, CEO of the giant money management firm, BlackRock Inc., with which CalPERS has invested, told its board in July, “You’ll be lucky to get 6 percent on your portfolios, maybe 5 percent.”

Even that might be optimistic.  When mortgages were returning 10% and you could expect a 1% chargeoff ratio and a 1% management fee, you could maybe meet the goal with a moderate amount of leverage.  When mortgages are yielding sub 5% and chargeoffs and management fees eat up most of that, you’d have to create an insane amount of leverage, which only increases your risk, to make it even rationally feasible, if even possible.

Why is this important?  Well, the benchmark rate determines the contribution rates, both of members and the State Government.  This is only one of many elephants in the room in California that noone wants to talk about it.  At precisely the time when the state can least afford to spend even more money, it may be required to.  Which only makes the situation more dire.  State and local government employees in California (in many, but not all cases) already enjoy higher pay than their private enterprise counterparts.  In addition to that, they are afforded better health benefits, vacation packages, and generous pay packages and benefits upon retirement.  When the world has all but forgotten pensions, many state employees enjoy the grandaddy of them all, a defined benefit pension plan.

It even seems quaint to talk about it since few still understand the difference between the defined benefit and defined contribution pensions.  It will suffice to say that the defined benefit is almost always much, much better, and much, much more expensive.  It’s quaint because most people who are not state employees in California do not even have a significant 401K, much less a crappy pension.  This is nothing compared to the Cadillac pension plan that virtually ALL state employees get.

So, to sum it up, California faces a budget shortfall of epic proportions.  It has parlayed every non-GAAP accounting trick in the book to delay the day of reckoning, hoping that pink ponies save them, but they have not.  The bill is quickly coming due, and indeed, the state may have even more troubles.  There is no way out.  Without serious pension reform (hand their asses back to them), taxes will have to be raised.  Given that the state already recalled one governor over licensing fees, I see this one going over like a lead balloon.  Meg Whitman has been campaigning that she can fix this mess.  I’m sorry, but there is nothing that will fix that mess except for a miracle or much higher taxes.  This still will need to invent something seriously out of this world to make that happen, or bite down on the bullet of austerity to balance the budget and maybe put something away for a rainy day (if it gets any rainier, this place is going to figuratively float away).

We need another investment bubble.  Luckily, the goldrush of 1849 proves that there is significant gold in them thar hills.  Perhaps we can put a tax on pickaxes and heavy machinery that will help us cover some of the shortfall.  With the bubbly prices that gold is now fetching, it might just do the trick.  However, I wouldn’t expect the Marijuana tax proposed earlier to make a big dent.  We’d need some serious potheads to move here to make it work (and they’d have to be stinkin’ rich to boot).

No, perhaps we we all need to collectively do as Californian’s is to do what CALPERS will in the end be forced to do.  Lower our expectations.  But, when have you ever known Californians to do that?

• Deflation , Delusion , Denial
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Chuck Ponzi December 1st, 2009

Bernanke should have just let the suckers fail and mopped up the mess. Our banking system would be better off if he had.

• Denial
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Brad_Davidson November 30th, 2009

Can anyone here excuse this?  Doesn’t anyone else see a problem with the government pressuring private enterprise to do what they want them to do?

Is anyone really believing this shite?

Faced with sluggish progress in its foreclosure-prevention effort, the Obama administration will spend the coming weeks cracking down on mortgage companies that aren’t doing enough to help borrowers at risk of losing their homes.

Treasury Department officials said Monday they will step up pressure on the 71 companies participating in the government’s $75 billion effort to stem the foreclosure crisis. The will start this week by sending three person “SWAT teams” to monitor the eight largest companies’ work and requesting twice-daily reports on their progress.

This reads straight out of an SS playbook.  Fascism has a singular face, and it is bullying and intimidation!  That’s change we can believe in.

• Denial , Panic
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Chuck Ponzi September 17th, 2009

This post is being put out for those readers who are seeing the unfolding of 2009 and wonder if we are at a housing bottom. Indeed, volumes have increased dramatically, and one can hardly turn on the tv, radio, or internet without being barraged with news that the housing market has hit bottom and is quickly recovering. I understand why one would be confused. After all, the housing market has improved, and the global stock market is deeply in rally territory after hitting rock bottom in March. However, this is time time when one has to ask themselves why they were waiting to buy a house in the first place. Was it because it was too expensive? Was it because you were worried about prices slipping more? Or, was it just because you wanted to catch the bottom and look like a genius in 10 more years? Well, if any of these motivations, you’ll have different answers of when to buy.

If you waited to buy a house because it was too expensive, ask yourself, is it too expensive now?  This is the easiest concern to get over.  In the throes of the housing bubble, you would have been told by your agent that you should just lower your expectations.  Buy a smaller place.  Buy a place further out.  Buy a place you don’t want, but can afford.  I’ll dispel any myths, there is no such thing as a crystal ball.  Just as I tell you that scamsters like Gary Watts didn’t know was going to happen, we also only operated on verifiable information.  All information is telling us that while a bit of affordability has returned, the underlying problems with the housing market still exist.  Let’s outline those quickly:

1.  Housing exceeds healthy income limits for much of Southern California (inland areas are back to a healthy level, so this really only refers to coastal areas, and some pockets throughout.

2.  Interest rates are low, masking the affordability problems mentioned above.  Rates are low because the Federal Reserve is intentionally targeting mortgage rates by purchasing up to 50% of all issued mortgage paper.  This is only intended to be temporary, and at some point, not only will this be removed, the current leverage must be unwound.  It is likely that interest rates will proceed higher.  While noone can know for sure when this will be done, it is likely to have an impact in the 2nd half of 2010 and into 2011.

3.  Unemployment in Southern California is increasing.  This is a known fact, and is expected to peak sometime in 2010 if things immediately improve.  However, it is expected that the decline will be less than steep, and high unemployment could persist for up to 5  more years after the recession ends.  Add in that California has become a very difficult place for many businesses to continue due to high taxes and infrastructure problems, and many companies are looking at alternatives if they upstaff.  Only lower wages will attract them back.  Lower wages do not increase home prices.

4.  The option-arm Tsunami has not come yet.  With an expected default rate that is much higher than subprime, and a concentration in coastal California, much of pain that inland areas sufferend is expected to occur in the more expensive areas.  If this materializes, buyers today are “catching the falling knife”.  The option arm recasts are expected to peak starting this quarter and cresting late 2010 and not declining until 2011 or 2012.

5.  The move-up market is dead.  The most starkly different part of this bust versus prior busts is that many, many people over-leveraged their houses even more than their increase in value.  Indeed, so many people are underwater at prices that locals can afford that it’s impossible for the majority of home buyers to move up at all.  This is one of the reasons that the low end is the most active areas.  Higher areas are simply over-priced for locals who fear for their jobs and have suffered a calamitous stock market setback.

6.  The banking system is unhealthy.  Leverage, and indeed money supply is decreasing.  This is the backside of a debt-fueled overcapacity bubble.  First, it was businesses that were overleveraged.  Then it was households.  Soon, it will be government, and there won’t be enough income to support the levels of debt and still account for imperfections in the system.  Someday, we’ll worry about

So, if you’re still interested in buying after knowing all of that, don’t say nobody warned you.  I understand, sometimes the social peer pressures push us to do irrational things.  Just look back at the bubble.  And, with the seemingly invincible Federal Government pulling out all stops to stimulate housing sales and ownership, it might seem that you just want to throw in the towel and give it up.  I know, I’ve wondered if it’s worth the wait.  I won’t think bad of anybody who buys now.

However, if you’re waiting for prices to come down more, I believe they will, but don’t fool yourself, no one will intentionally catch the bottom.  I don’t believe we’ll see the bottom until noone cares anymore, that’s how bubbles work historically.  We are, however, still pulling demand from the future.  We’ll overshoot by that much, at some point.  It can be fast and painful, or it can be slow and painful.  Either way, we haven’t had pain in the coastal areas yet.

Besides, if you’re wanting people to think you’re a genius, you might be surprised to find that no one likes the smartest guy in the room.  I know a lot of Goldman Sachs employees are finding that out.

• Deflation , Delusion , Denial
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Chuck Ponzi September 1st, 2009

Consider the above video in light of Chris Whalen’s post today at The Big Picture: Q2 2009 Bank Stress Test Results: The Zombie Dance Party Rocks On

There are some thoughts that Chris presents that are of utmost interest here:

Plain fact is that the Fed and Treasury spent all the available liquidity propping up Wall Street’s toxic asset waste pile and the banks that created it, so now Main Street employers and private investors, and the relatively smaller banks that support them both, must go begging for capital and liquidity in a market where government is the only player left. The notion that the Fed can even contemplate reversing the massive bailout for the OTC markets, this to restore normalcy to the monetary models that supposedly inform the central bank’s deliberations, is ridiculous in view of the capital shortfall in the banking sector and the private sector economy more generally.

…

Perhaps there is revisionist thinking at the Fed at long last, but not nearly soon enough to do anything about the impending implosion of the US banking sector in 2010. The significant point to us is not the cost to the FDIC insurance fund implied by the rising Bank Stress Index score, a cost which the banking industry will absorb and repay. But the real point is the permanent diminution of economic activity in local communities caused when good community and regional banks die due to the end-result of bad fiscal and regulatory policies in Washington.

There are a boat load of smaller banks that are being put into crisis through the crowding out effect of government influence with heavy-handed intervention.  Sooner or later, either the propped up banks be allowed to fail, or they will cause many more smaller banks to fail.  Which would you rather have?

• Bailout , Denial , Liquidity Trap
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Chuck Ponzi August 27th, 2009

Do you agree with Davidowitz?

Seems pretty bleak to me too. I’m trying hard to be an optimist, but it doesn’t seem like anything has improved, only gotten worse. In fact, California is now showing a 11.9% unemployment rate.

Even the supposed venerable and indestructible Los Angeles has an 11.6% rate and bulletproof Orange County has 9.2%. Those are all depression-era numbers when factoring in the

• Delusion , Denial
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Chuck Ponzi August 5th, 2009

All risk in America seems to go one way:  the the taxpayer, unfortunately that’s not reflected in this cartoon:

• Denial
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Chuck Ponzi June 8th, 2009

I’ll start off by saying that I don’t know exactly when the bottom for Southern California is, but that I’m confident 2009 is not it, not by a long shot.  So, with that in mind, I am beginning a series of systematic exploration of previous bubbles and how we might relate this time around to give us a reference to what me might expect this time.

There seem to be some myths circulating both in the Financial Media as well as the blogosphere about exactly how long housing busts tend to last.  To clarify some of these myths, I’ll borrow heavily from 2 of the best know (and contemporary) housing busts, the Southern California 1990’s housing bubble and bust and some from the Japanese housing bubble and bust.

These myths are some that have cropped up at reputable financial media sites and on television often (I believe) because the human attention span is very short.  We find it difficult to believe that bad times can persist for a long period of time.  We have a coping method that tends to follow a predefined path, often known as the Kübler-Ross Model or Stages of Grief.  Over a period of time, we pass through Denial, Anger, Bargaining, Depression, and finally Acceptance.  However, keep in mind that just because humans have gotten over the financial tragedy of the 2000’s (which we haven’t), there is no specific reason why that should translate into a financial or economic end to the problems.  The real world operates outside of our internalized emotions.

Still, these myths are strong emotional pulls that if believed, will lead you astray.  Over the coming week or 2 I will be taking a guided tour through some of the strongest myths that have gripped the housing market.  Let’s start with the most pressing one right away:

Myth #1.  As soon as the recession ends, housing will jump right back up.

This myth plays on the fear that was found to be prevalent during the housing bubble.  It plays on the “buy now or be priced out forever” fear of being left behind.  Indeed, one could argue that immediately after the 2000 recession, housing prices quickly vaulted to the stratosphere and left many high and dry.  If this were to happen again, all those currently sitting on the sidelines would once again be left in the dust as many others partake in the new propserity of housing wealth.

However, keep in mind that the 2001 recession was not housing led like the July 1990 recession.  While both were quite short, they were very different.  In Southern California, the effects of the 1990 recession were felt long after it ended in March 1991.  Indeed, housing prices had been inflated to bubblicious prices as early as 1989.  As the economy strained under high housing prices, both consumption fell as well as pulled a number of financial institutions with it.  Albeit much smaller than the present crisis, the Savings & Loan crisis still strikes fear into the hearts of many bankers.  That was supposed to be “the big one”, and yet, it appears nothing was learned by that experience about residential prices risk taking.  This crisis played out much like the previous crisis, where defaults led to restricted credit which in turn hurt businesses.  Households strained under the increased debt load that had been created during the housing bubble in the previous 5 years, and that final crack shattered the weakest financial institutions.  The effect snowballed into a full blown crisis, requiring the formation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, or RTC.  The RTC did what the banks could not, liquidate assets in a timely manner.  This quick liquidation set the stage for a much stronger rally later in the decade and avoided a Japan-style housing bust where banks hold bad assets for fear of becoming insolvent and being remanded into recievership unwillingly.

First off, let’s clearly define how long housing prices fell during the 1990’s following the late 80’s bubble.  The following graph is inflation adjusted to 2008 prices, but the amount is not as important as the trip that was taken:

Source: Dataquick and BLS

As the readers can easily see, the 1990’s bubble was retraced in nearly every single major SoCal county.  Orange County, for example did not complete a full retrace as it developed from a sleepy surfing and vacation town into a pricey suburb of the LA area.  However, for most counties, there was a full retracement to the pre-bubble inflation-indexed prices.

There are some notable trends that one can see in the numbers.  First, that falls were fairly mild, so there was a transitory period for homeowners who had accumulated significant wealth through paying down mortgages and through inflation could still “get out” before the door closed.  This is important to the swiftness and the after-effects of the housing bust because it differs significantly with the existing housing bust.  Indeed, so slight was this housing bust, that many believed we would fare the same this time around (allowing inflation to eat away at the home prices makes them an economically bad decision, but not necessarily a bad financial decision if the price is right and the tax benefits are right as well).  With prices clearly more than 20% off in all counties this time around, a recession that it likely to be almost 3X as long as the 1990’s and with reckless speculation not seen since the 1920’s, a “soft landing” was never in the cards.  This the hardest landing we will have in our lifetimes.  Make no mistake about it, this will not be easily forgotten like the last bubble.

The next notable trend that one finds is that even after the recession ends in March 1991, housing prices continue to fall for 5 additional years until 1996.  This was primarily because several of the savings and loans tried to time the market, waiting for a rebound.  Only to find that their hesitation caused them to miss higher prices, eventually dumping them later as regulators forced them to liquidate into a softer market.  In a housing bust, there is no orderly decline, if we have learned one thing from prior busts, it is this: the longer you wait to foreclose and liquidate the property, the greater the economic loss and the more significant the effect to the financial institution.  In fact, so ingrained in the minds of market participants that housing was a risky investment that the greater masses shunned it for some time afterwards, only beginning to buy again when the argument was much more compelling than renting.  When buying was cheaper than renting, even accounting for potential losses.  We have not yet reached that point, as any further declines wipes out significant equity since in most places in Southern California, renting is still a significantly cheaper option after factoring tax consequences for most locals.

To give you a breath of where we have come so far, the following is the Southern California Housing Prices inflation adjusted for 2008:

Source: Dataquick and BLS

You can see that there has been no transition time for owners to jettison out the escape hatch.  While this is primarily a problem to do with mix (very low priced properties selling vs a normal mix), I will explore this more in detail in a future myth review.  Please note that even with the dramatic drop in prices, we have not seen a full retracement.  With the magnitude of the present bubble in perspective, I find it unlikely that at present course and speed we will simply give up at a retracement to prior fundamentals.  I fully expect an overshoot of epic proportions as the bubble that preceeded it was of epic proportions.  Here’s a chart showing the 2 bubbles side by side, adjusted for inflation:

Source: Dataquick and BLS

Finally, it is important to remember that when housing does bottom, it does not turn on a dime.  It is much like a vast oil tanker that requires significant time and distance to change course.  Ingrained social opinions are slow to change, but once they do, they don’t flip flop back.  We saw this in the Wile E. Coyote moments of 2007-2008 in our present bubble.  This recession is going to be significantly longer, and the recovery substantially slower than previous ones.  Indeed, the “truth about jobs” is that there may be many fewer than before because we are no longer driven by a significant bubble in Southern California (at least in the forseeable future) while the late 1990’s recieved a shot in the arm.

Some thoughts about the current unemployment rate (which is over 10% in California at the present time) and future projections over the next 2 years.

Indeed, remember that in past recessions, unemployment peaked some time after the recession ended, hence the effects of the recession being felt much longer than the recession lasting.  It is important to remember that the end of a recession only signals that the economy has stopped contracting.  It does not mean that there will be a quick return to the heady days of the prosperous times that preceded it.  This time might be much worse, as household balance sheets are still carrying considerable debt with litle savings.  Until those are rectified, it is hard to see any meaningful reignition of economic activity that is not inflation-linked.  And, with joblessness at record levels, any inflation we do see will not be the kind of inflation we saw in the 1970’s, constituting a wage-price spiral.

We’ll touch on that next time when we discuss Myth #2, Housing Prices will jump as soon as unemployment begins to come down.

• Bottom Callers , Denial , Housing Crash , Mean Reversion , Real Estate Myths , SoCal , predictions
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Chuck Ponzi May 12th, 2009

For loyal long-time readers, you may remember this one.  It was my very first Happy Birthday Socal post.  And, one of my favorites.

Yes, the SCREBC-famous Pepto Bismol House in San Clemente.

My assertion at the time was that there were several problems in order of increasing stupidity:

1.  Terrible Marketing, pictures, etc.

2.  Terrible Pricing… one year on the market, chasing it down and never being close enough to reality

3.  Terrible Location.  I’ll let the picture speak for itself:

Well, if you wondered what happened… it’s back up for sale.

Yes, a scant nearly 2 1/2 years on the market hasn’t deterred this delusional seller from trying to sell for higher than market prices.  It’s listed today for 649K, probably a full 150K higher than what it would take to move the property.  At least they came down from 875K in December 2006.  If they had been aggressive then, I believe they could easily have gotten 750K to 775K at the time.  Unfortunately, greed got the better of the owner, the listing agent, or both.

The post is a “What Not to Wear” for home listings.  And, remember in September 2007 when the bubble was still a debateable topic?  Yeah, I warned the sellers then that the next year was going to be tough.  It was.

And, it doesn’t seem to be getting any easier.  Keep in mind that one of the properties that I compared it to last time seems to have been foreclosed on and appears to presently be in shadow inventory land.  It (a 2700sq ft sfr built in 2001 with much better curb appeal) appears to have gone back to the bank in January at $568.5K.  That doesn’t bode well for the area.

Besides, I think the realtor must not have changed or learned much in the intervening 2 years about property marketing:

I think she learned to turn the camera on its side this time… projects height.

Luckily, the buyer bought in 2000 for $402K.  They’re almost assured a gain on the house unless they already spent it.  Let’s hope they didn’t.  If this doesn’t sell, it’ll always be shadow inventory, waiting for prices to tick back up.  Unfortunately, there are many better prices in the area this time around.  Even though the listing is now 225K lighter, I’m afraid it’s still in fantasy land.

Thanks and come again to Fantasy Island.

• Delusion , Denial , Housing Crash
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Chuck Ponzi March 6th, 2009

Finally, I agree with Jim Rogers on something:

We need the insanity to stop.  Stop rewarding bad behavior, let the country be fixed.

• Denial
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