Chuck Ponzi February 24th, 2010

Proposition 13 was the “biggest tax revolt” in California’s history.

KPBS San Diego did an interesting piece on raising taxes in California and Prop 13’s effect on this.

Thirty-two years ago, Californians en masse went to the polls and approved the largest tax-limiting legislation in recent history.  Basically, it limited the property taxes that could be assigned to a property.

In response, many municipalities responded by building more hotels, retail, and more while limiting the amount of houses (municipalities earn more money from sales and occupancy taxes than on property tax).  This leaves the state perpetually building too few houses, and worse, restricting adaptive reuse of residential real estate into higher density because of the reassesment rules.

Personally, there are 3 major qualms I have with Prop 13.

1.  This is not a homestead exemption, so it does nothing to favor homeowners over landlords (who already have strong incentives through.  This is landlord welfare.

2.  Commercial properties are not exempted (they have a fixed base as well).  This is fundamentally flawed, since it favors property-owning companies who lease as their primary business.  This is corporate welfare.

3.  There is no means test.  Millionaires have the same exemptions as indigent elderly.  This is welfare for the rich.

Unfortunately, taxpayers were sold that little old ladies were getting kicked out of their homes.  While this is true, we could avoid the landlord, corporate, and rich welfare by instituting some changes to the original proposition.

Instead, we have serious imbalances because cities favor not building homes unless they have significant Mello-Roos attached to them, allow corporate transfer of assets to perpetually avoid reassesment, and allows non-citizens and non-tax payers of California to receive the benefits of everyone else’s pain.  How do you feel about prop 13?

The money shot for me?

RAND (Caller, La Jolla): Thank you for taking my call and thanks for this discussion. I would just like to put two issues on the table. The main one is something that really shocks me, never comes up in these types of discussions, which is the distinction between commercial properties and homes. Of course, nobody wants homeowners to be taxed out of their homes but Prop 13 also holds down the property taxes paid by shopping malls, office buildings, all kinds of commercial properties. And they have a loophole that homeowners don’t have, which is that they can sell the holding company that owns the property and then someone else can take ownership of that property but, theoretically, it hasn’t changed hands, just the company has changed hands. And so there’s many commercial properties in the state that have not been reassessed for many years and they’re not paying the cost of the essential services that they need to stay in business. And I think that that aspect of Proposition 13 is very unfair and needs to be changed.

• Housing Crash , Prop 13
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Chuck Ponzi January 12th, 2010

Andy Xie of Morgan Stanley has written some of the best commentary describing the innerworkings and problems of the Chinese bubble (don’t ask me if there is one, although it sounds like there is, I have not done my homework, as I’m sure Andy has).

Some time ago, he wrote Chinese asset markets have become a giant Ponzi scheme that perked up my ears and got me to thinking.

But, his more recent piece in Caing has me thinking he’s talking about Southern California:

The overwhelming desire for getting rich quick dominates every nook, fissure and strata of Chinese society.

Ok, replace “Chinese” with California, and you’ve got a definite match.

Bubbles exaggerate reality but are not formed out of thin air. Cheap money and strong growth are the usual ingredients for bubble-making.

This is almost exactly what I wrote with “What is a bubble?” several years ago.  However, most interestingly is what is happening in China, and happened in California:

China’s property market is creating winners and losers based on timing. All other factors – including education and experience — have been marginalized as the economy rewards speculators. And as more play the game, the speculator ranks rise and fewer people work, perhaps contributing to a labor shortage.

This is exactly what happened during Southern California’s property bubble.  Many people got rich simply by being in the right place at the right time.  Many of them were incapable of understanding the circumstances of the rise, and so therefore simply did more of the same (buy real estate) without understanding the underlying problem that widespread repetition of that practice would cause a housing shortage (too many people “storing” housing instead of allowing it to be bought).  Rents reflected the “real demand”, and appreciated strongly.  Meanwhile, properties exploded with enough appreciation in 2 years to account for 30 years of inflation to support the prices.

The most poignant in my mind was a short-sale that Brad (my co-blogger and realtor) and I visited.  The original owner was trying to sell from a purchase made in 1996 at more than 300K lower than the short-sale.  The “owner” was so destitute that when the pool pump broke and they were unable to replace the $800 unit, the resulting ground shift due to hydrostatic pressure when quickly emptying the pool caused many more thousands in damage to the surrounding concrete.  They had been trying to support a 600K+ mortgage with a single income from working at Macy’s.  When regular equity withdrawals worked, the Ponzi scheme continued.

In normal times, the ponzi would have never worked, but because of the bubble, it allowed the “owner” to continue to persist in a property many times more expensive than they could support.  At the peak of the market, this would have sold for more than $1M, requiring the income of several well-paid professionals, not a single retail salesperson’s income.  The world did not make sense in 2006.

This separation of is true of a speculation/investment-centric economy.  This is part of the reason why most people make terrible investors; the concept of time is nebulous and fraught with uncertainty.  Indeed, I wrote (and bolded) in What is a Bubble? the following:

The most fundamental concept of investing is the concept of timing. The most fundamental flaw in most participants logic is that the asset provides more than just money… everything that costs money is an investment and can be traded again for money, nothing more.

This Southern California phenomenon of irrational belief has been covered extensively in another blogger’s repertoire, Irvine Renter’s Southern California’s Cultural Pathology.

We are quickly approaching the Day of Reckoning in our housing market. In my view this will be Armageddon for California debtors: the spending will stop, they will lose their homes and with it their illusion of wealth, and they most definitely will not be enjoying life. The cause of all the weeping and gnashing of teeth will not be some exogenous event, but rather a direct result of the circumstances they themselves created.

My thoughts exactly.

• Credit Bubble , Housing Crash , Speculation , Unemployment
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Chuck Ponzi October 28th, 2009

Much of the last 4-5 months has seen a veritable frenzy of activity in the housing market throughout Southern California and throughout the rest of the US.  What does this mean?  Have we hit a bottom?  Is it a dead cat bounce?  Or, was the last year a bump across the bottom before an explosion upwards?

Well, if you’re looking for easy answers, I don’t have a crystal ball, any better than anyone else, so it’s nearly impossible to tell you where its going.  But, I can tell you the basics of the Long, Medium, and Short term.  Much of this is common sense, but must be repeated constantly to remain tethered.

Long Term Prediction

Eventually, though, it’s an argument about inflation or deflation.  Housing prices relative to incomes, rents, and inflation have moderated, but at a much higher level than historically, as pointed out by Dr. Shiller above.  If this is indeed a bottom, the ramifications of higher home prices are profound.  Consider for a moment, the beginning of this thought expounded in the WAPO yesterday regarding the housing stimulus:

Putting cash in pockets does have a stimulative effect because some of that cash will turn into consumption. But as far as stimulus measures go, it has a low multiplier (the ratio of new economic activity to stimulus spending). By contrast, we could take the same cash and hire more teachers, police officers or soldiers to fight in Afghanistan. We would get more economic activity, and the government would get something for its money.

But the tax credit stabilizes the housing market, people say. What does this mean? It means that the credit keeps housing prices artificially high. But housing is something that all people need. Why do we want it to be expensive? Would we want government policies that artificially push up the price of food?

To take it a step further, is there anything in this world that we consume that we would cheer when it goes up in price?  Nevertheless, even knowing how wasteful, inefficient, and stupid the measure is, our congress seems intent on passing an extension of the home buyer credit.  Even worse, it appears to be expanding to existing homeowners, completely negating the originally intended purpose of clearing inventory.  Of course that could be in large part because inventory in many areas has dramatically decreased, and it’s simply a matter of pork and pork products for the housing industry.

Currently, housing prices receive the largest subsidy of any asset class, and for what?  To make our neighborhoods better in some way?

But isn’t it just better for more people to own their homes? The conventional wisdom is that homeownership has positive externalities: Homeowners are more likely to invest in their communities, and it is the best way to build household wealth. But the evidence for this is mixed. In “Our Lot,” Alyssa Katz cites three academic studies and concludes: “Scholars found that once they set aside the various traits that tend to determine whether someone chooses to own or rent one’s home, homeowners and tenants really aren’t that different. . . . Often the new homebuyers were purchasing the worst housing in the worst neighborhoods with the worst schools — hardly a solid investment.”

So, to recap, we’re giving money to people to do what they were going to do anyway, and thereby increasing our own costs and driving malinvestment into residential housing instead of manufacturing capacity or research and development reducing our country’s competitiveness.  We’re taking money away from firefighters, teachers, and policemen so that your neighbor can afford a larger SUV or better furniture, and this entire premise is built on the disproved theory that won’t improve our neighborhoods in any way?

As I mentioned earlier, the real fight is about inflation or deflation.  There is no doubt that inflation is a monetary phenomenon.  At the present time, the deflationary forces of deleveraging are stronger than the inflationary forces of the stimulus packages and absurd monetary policy.

Make no mistake about it, in the long run, our currency will be devalued through inflation to nothing.  This is the fate of every fiat currency, and given the political stupidity that occurs when large numbers of people vote conmen and shamsters into political office.  This is the state of the US, and there is no indication that this will ever change.  Just look at the last 30 years.  In this environment, you will want to hold assets, not cash in the long run.

Medium Term Prediction

However, in the long run, we’re all dead, so we need to know what’s going to happen in the next 3-5 years.  What we can expect are the following in the medium term.

1.  Higher taxes.  This is true of both state and federal taxes.  We are on an unsustainable path.  While most Americans would rather make do with smaller government, the fox guarding the henhouses will never allow themselves to be kicked out.  This means less money to be spent on food, housing, healthcare, education, etc.

2.  Low interest rates.  Financing will stay very loose as long as interest rates are held down.  This is the latest salvo on the war against savers.  Banks, governments, and every company is doing everything it can to separate you from your money.  Most Americans will simply give up because they know nothing else.  Saving will come from outside the US, and not inside.  American’s balance sheets are beyond repair.  Nothing can save the average consumer now.

3.  Commodities Bubble.  Expect the next bubble to be in hard assets.  Perhaps this is oil, gold, natural gas, copper, lumber, corn, porkbellies, wheat, etc, etc, etc.  The government DOES want prices to go up, and will do anything to make it.  It would rather destroy Americans in its quest to save them than to admit that they don’t know and just let the world sort it out.  Most commonly, those who think they understand economics are far more dangerous than those who study it.

To be sure, there are no easy answers, even in the medium term.  And, beware that many of the above issues work against each other, so it will all be relative.  For example, low interest rates will drive a weaker dollar, rising prices on products which will improve export industries that may end up increasing jobs and demand and moderate the decline of the dollar.  Such paradoxes routinely exist, and help prevent the currency of a diversified economy such as the USD from declining too quickly too fast.  But make no mistake, the endgame of the fiat currency is to fall to zero value.  Eventually, houses will hold their value, even if prices are still too high.  This just means that they will endure long periods of poor returns relative to other assets.

If housing prices stabilize here, there will be no free lunch that returns us to high returns. That can only come if they fall below intrinsic value, something I feel supremely assured in saying has not happened in Coastal California (not true of deep inland Cali such as the Victor Valley or Palm Springs).  Orange County, San Diego Coastal, Los Angeles Coastal, and Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties are still painfully overvalued in relation to their alternatives.

The medium term case to own a home in Coastal California is uncertain.  I predict that we will have a clearer picture in the short-term predictions, but there are no certainties with this much malinvestment.

Short Term Prediction

There has been a significant shift from foreclosures.  Various reasons abound as to the cause, but there is no clear reason that the Notice of Defaults has continued to rise to record astronomical levels while foreclosures have remained relatively low.

The Big Picture takes up part of that story with “Strategic Non-Foreclosure” and the Piggington site details some of the statistics in the recent past for SoCal.

Do not be misled, there is a serious imbalance that has grown between defaults and foreclosures.  Foreclosures are dramatically lower than they should be given the incidence of defaults.  There are 2 possible reasons for this imbalance:

1.  Banks are having difficulty foreclosing.  Numerous possiblities exist for this reason such as poorly equipped staff, moratoriums, trepidation of foreclosure while on government dole, stated contradictory policies, and many more.  The general perception is that this will eventually result in higher foreclosures once the problems are dealt with.  Noone knows when that historical balance will return.

2.  Banks are actually working out modifications and they are sticking.  This could mean that a dramatically higher number of modifications are being approved and they are having the intended effect of reducing the market’s fall.  This would be difficult to explain.  Never in history has this happened, but never in history have we been this indebted before either.

While it’s entirely possible that #2 is happening, the risk is much higher that #1 is the actual case.  The table is clearly tilted on a risk/reward basis that #1 is happening. Smart money should hold out at this time until the trend is clear.  While the past 4 months is the first indication of stabilization, an unbroken 1 year trend will be the clear signal.  The soonest that could happen is next spring.  That is the earliest BUY signal that the housing bubble could  give us since Summer 2005.  We will simply have to see if that buy signal is confirmed for early entrants.  Purchasing now is highly speculative and likely to result in knife-catching.

According to Occam’s Razor, it is beter to attribute the latest moves to #1.  I cannot stress this enough that the risk/reward ratio still favors waiting for much of Southern California.  The exceptions to this are areas where buying is at a significant discount to renting (some exist).  It doesn’t preclude the possibility of failure, but it does give options for medium term and longer term trends to mitigate the risks of buying a home now.  For coastal california, any purchase now can only be seen as speculative and imprudent.

The Final Wrap

The basis of any bubble is a speculative frenzy.  Recognizing the attributes of a speculative frenzy and the stages bubbles go through is critical to timing any asset purchase.

Remember, there is nothing more fundamental to investing than timing.  Anyone who tells you otherwise is a fool.  Timing your purchases of stocks, bonds, commodities, housing, or any other asset is critical to success.

My hope was that this country and its leaders could see the value of letting housing prices fall to their intrinsic demand value, but leadership is nearly absent in US politics today.  There does not appear to be an opportunity for this to happen any time soon.

• Bottom Callers , Dead Cat Bounce , Deflation , Housing Crash
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Chuck Ponzi September 22nd, 2009

As I have been saying since I began the blog some 4 years ago, the majority of pain that homeowners are feeling was self-inflicted.  Today, Inman news reports to us on MIT’s Sloan School of business study on home-equity raping and the cause of so many foreclosures.  The money shot?

estimating that without cash-out refinancings and other withdrawals of homeowner equity, only 3 percent of outstanding mortgages would have been underwater at the end of last year

Basically, mortgage borrowers bought the rope to hang themselves.

I would recommend reading the entire article, but here’s an excerpt:

The study didn’t take into account the behavior of lenders or the supply of money available to refinance, instead assuming that borrowers could refinance as often as they wished at prevailing interest rates. That may have been pretty much the case in the decade leading up to the market’s June 2006 peak, the study said, with homeowners eager to take on debt and lenders only too willing to accommodate them.

But the study illustrates a more subtle problem than the “dysfunctional individual and institutional behavior” exhibited during the boom, said authors Amir E. Khandani, Andrew W. Lo, and Robert C. Merton.

“While excessive risk-taking, overly aggressive lending practices, pro-cyclical regulations, and political pressures surely contributed to the recent problems in the U.S. housing market, our simulations show that even if all homeowners, lenders, investors, insurers, rating agencies, regulators, and policymakers behaved rationally, ethically, and with the purest of motives, financial crises can still occur,” the study said.

“Near frictionless” refinancing opportunities, when they occur simultaneously with declining interest rates and rising home prices, create a “ratchet” effect in which homeowners exchange the equity they’ve built in their homes for debt they can’t easily “unwind,” the study said.

The situation poses a risk for lenders, too. A formerly diverse pool of borrowers — some who’d had comfortable levels of equity in their homes, and loans that were well on their way to being paid off — becomes synchronized, as if each had bought their homes at the height of the market with the highest allowable loan-to-value ratios.

When home prices decline, lenders have no way to compel homeowners to add more equity, like the margin calls employed by stock brokers when investors buy shares with borrowed money. Unlike equities investors who can sell off part of their portfolio to meet a margin call, homeowners can’t sell part of their home to reduce their debt ratio.

There’s no easy way to address the “refinancing ratchet effect,” the study said, because the three factors that can lead to trouble — declining interest rates, rising home prices, and easy access to mortgage loans — are “benign market conditions” often seen as indicators of economic growth.

“No easy legislative or regulatory solutions exist, such as prohibiting the Fed from cutting interest rates below a certain threshold, or placing a ceiling on housing prices, or putting ’sand in the gears’ of the refinancing system and limiting consumer credit,” the study said.

In the end, were using the money from refinancing to supplement declining income, as was the case of a short sale I recently went to see with Brad Davidson (co-blogger and Broker at We-Help-U-Buy).  The homeowner had purchased some 20+ years earlier, but had withdrawn over $500K in the last decade.  Meanwhile, not a cent was put into home maintenance as the entire place was original.  In fact, she had cost the home probably $10K in damage to the in-ground pool draining too quickly because the pool pump broke and she didn’t have $800 to replace it.  (Hydrostatic pressure will do some interesting things to concrete when the opposing force is removed.

The most amazing thing to me during the housing downturn is the number and amount of refis that I have seen.  It seems MOST of Southern California took out several hundred thousand dollars each from their houses; enough to buy entire houses outright in most other places in the country.  Some of the most amazing and bizarre examples have been in the wealthiest enclaves, likely in an attempt to keep up with the Jones’.  This kind of insanity is well-documented in IrvineRenter’s Southern California’s Cultural Pathology.

The road ahead is still going to be fraught with disaster, as it will take us decades to rebuild our consumer balance sheets after having pulled so much of our income forward through equity withdrawals.  Let’s hope that we can do it sooner than later.

• Credit Bubble , Housing Crash
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Chuck Ponzi August 6th, 2009

It’s no surprise to most readers, but banks are finally figuring out that which was already extensively investigated and reported on by SoCal bubble bloggers; that the primary determinant of foreclosure is not the point at which the buyer purchased the home, but rather all of the “wealth harvesting” that was done via refinancings and second mortgages.  Nowhere is this more prevalent than in Orange County, it seems.  Most of the area’s extravagent showings of wealth were actually extracted from home equity.

A recent study by CSU Fullerton with assistance from Fannie Mae has linked the correlation of cash-out refinancings with foreclosure.  The main takeaway:  Homedebtors who are now in foreclosure are not victims of circumstance (the prevalent thinking in Washington), but rather victims of their own selfish and greedy tastes.

The Wall Street Journal has some a great summary up by Nick Timiraos.

Michael LaCour-Little, a finance professor at California State University at Fullerton, looked at 4,000 foreclosures in Southern California from 2006-08. He found that, at least in Southern California, borrowers who defaulted on their mortgages didn’t purchase their homes at the top of the market. Instead, the average acquisition was made in 2002 and many homes lost to foreclosure were bought in the 1990s. More than half of all borrowers who lost their homes had already refinanced at least once, and four out of five had a second mortgage.

The original loan-to-value ratio for these borrowers stood at a reasonable 84%, but second and third liens left homeowners with a combined loan-to-value ratio of about 150% by the time of the foreclosure sale date.

Borrowers, meanwhile, took out around $2 billion in equity from their homes, or nearly eight times the $262 million that they put into their homes. Lenders lost around four times as much as borrowers, seeing $1 billion in losses.

“[W]hile house price declines were important in explaining the incidence of negative equity, its magnitude was more strongly influenced by increased debt usage,” writes Mr. LaCour-Little. “Hence, borrower behavior, rather than housing market forces, is the predominant factor affecting outcomes.”

What happened in SoCal over the past few years has been tragic, not only because of what happened to families, but rather that it was a tragic waste of human abilities; a misallocation of our skills into a non-productive asset.  Rather than investing time and capital into a productive enterprise, it was wastefully fed into a giant Ponzi scheme.

Unfortunately, old speculative habits die hard, as is evidenced by the dearth of investment-worthy housing in the midst of a sea of WTF asking prices.

Now that the goose that laid the golden egg is killed, cooked, and finding its way through the proverbial lower intestine of our financial system, wealth will need to be made from something other than housing.  Here’s to hoping it’s something that actually produces value for our company.  However, considering the loose monetary and regulatory policies that are still written in stone, I wouldn’t hold my breath.

• Debt , Deflation , Housing Crash
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Chuck Ponzi June 8th, 2009

I’ll start off by saying that I don’t know exactly when the bottom for Southern California is, but that I’m confident 2009 is not it, not by a long shot.  So, with that in mind, I am beginning a series of systematic exploration of previous bubbles and how we might relate this time around to give us a reference to what me might expect this time.

There seem to be some myths circulating both in the Financial Media as well as the blogosphere about exactly how long housing busts tend to last.  To clarify some of these myths, I’ll borrow heavily from 2 of the best know (and contemporary) housing busts, the Southern California 1990’s housing bubble and bust and some from the Japanese housing bubble and bust.

These myths are some that have cropped up at reputable financial media sites and on television often (I believe) because the human attention span is very short.  We find it difficult to believe that bad times can persist for a long period of time.  We have a coping method that tends to follow a predefined path, often known as the Kübler-Ross Model or Stages of Grief.  Over a period of time, we pass through Denial, Anger, Bargaining, Depression, and finally Acceptance.  However, keep in mind that just because humans have gotten over the financial tragedy of the 2000’s (which we haven’t), there is no specific reason why that should translate into a financial or economic end to the problems.  The real world operates outside of our internalized emotions.

Still, these myths are strong emotional pulls that if believed, will lead you astray.  Over the coming week or 2 I will be taking a guided tour through some of the strongest myths that have gripped the housing market.  Let’s start with the most pressing one right away:

Myth #1.  As soon as the recession ends, housing will jump right back up.

This myth plays on the fear that was found to be prevalent during the housing bubble.  It plays on the “buy now or be priced out forever” fear of being left behind.  Indeed, one could argue that immediately after the 2000 recession, housing prices quickly vaulted to the stratosphere and left many high and dry.  If this were to happen again, all those currently sitting on the sidelines would once again be left in the dust as many others partake in the new propserity of housing wealth.

However, keep in mind that the 2001 recession was not housing led like the July 1990 recession.  While both were quite short, they were very different.  In Southern California, the effects of the 1990 recession were felt long after it ended in March 1991.  Indeed, housing prices had been inflated to bubblicious prices as early as 1989.  As the economy strained under high housing prices, both consumption fell as well as pulled a number of financial institutions with it.  Albeit much smaller than the present crisis, the Savings & Loan crisis still strikes fear into the hearts of many bankers.  That was supposed to be “the big one”, and yet, it appears nothing was learned by that experience about residential prices risk taking.  This crisis played out much like the previous crisis, where defaults led to restricted credit which in turn hurt businesses.  Households strained under the increased debt load that had been created during the housing bubble in the previous 5 years, and that final crack shattered the weakest financial institutions.  The effect snowballed into a full blown crisis, requiring the formation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, or RTC.  The RTC did what the banks could not, liquidate assets in a timely manner.  This quick liquidation set the stage for a much stronger rally later in the decade and avoided a Japan-style housing bust where banks hold bad assets for fear of becoming insolvent and being remanded into recievership unwillingly.

First off, let’s clearly define how long housing prices fell during the 1990’s following the late 80’s bubble.  The following graph is inflation adjusted to 2008 prices, but the amount is not as important as the trip that was taken:

Source: Dataquick and BLS

As the readers can easily see, the 1990’s bubble was retraced in nearly every single major SoCal county.  Orange County, for example did not complete a full retrace as it developed from a sleepy surfing and vacation town into a pricey suburb of the LA area.  However, for most counties, there was a full retracement to the pre-bubble inflation-indexed prices.

There are some notable trends that one can see in the numbers.  First, that falls were fairly mild, so there was a transitory period for homeowners who had accumulated significant wealth through paying down mortgages and through inflation could still “get out” before the door closed.  This is important to the swiftness and the after-effects of the housing bust because it differs significantly with the existing housing bust.  Indeed, so slight was this housing bust, that many believed we would fare the same this time around (allowing inflation to eat away at the home prices makes them an economically bad decision, but not necessarily a bad financial decision if the price is right and the tax benefits are right as well).  With prices clearly more than 20% off in all counties this time around, a recession that it likely to be almost 3X as long as the 1990’s and with reckless speculation not seen since the 1920’s, a “soft landing” was never in the cards.  This the hardest landing we will have in our lifetimes.  Make no mistake about it, this will not be easily forgotten like the last bubble.

The next notable trend that one finds is that even after the recession ends in March 1991, housing prices continue to fall for 5 additional years until 1996.  This was primarily because several of the savings and loans tried to time the market, waiting for a rebound.  Only to find that their hesitation caused them to miss higher prices, eventually dumping them later as regulators forced them to liquidate into a softer market.  In a housing bust, there is no orderly decline, if we have learned one thing from prior busts, it is this: the longer you wait to foreclose and liquidate the property, the greater the economic loss and the more significant the effect to the financial institution.  In fact, so ingrained in the minds of market participants that housing was a risky investment that the greater masses shunned it for some time afterwards, only beginning to buy again when the argument was much more compelling than renting.  When buying was cheaper than renting, even accounting for potential losses.  We have not yet reached that point, as any further declines wipes out significant equity since in most places in Southern California, renting is still a significantly cheaper option after factoring tax consequences for most locals.

To give you a breath of where we have come so far, the following is the Southern California Housing Prices inflation adjusted for 2008:

Source: Dataquick and BLS

You can see that there has been no transition time for owners to jettison out the escape hatch.  While this is primarily a problem to do with mix (very low priced properties selling vs a normal mix), I will explore this more in detail in a future myth review.  Please note that even with the dramatic drop in prices, we have not seen a full retracement.  With the magnitude of the present bubble in perspective, I find it unlikely that at present course and speed we will simply give up at a retracement to prior fundamentals.  I fully expect an overshoot of epic proportions as the bubble that preceeded it was of epic proportions.  Here’s a chart showing the 2 bubbles side by side, adjusted for inflation:

Source: Dataquick and BLS

Finally, it is important to remember that when housing does bottom, it does not turn on a dime.  It is much like a vast oil tanker that requires significant time and distance to change course.  Ingrained social opinions are slow to change, but once they do, they don’t flip flop back.  We saw this in the Wile E. Coyote moments of 2007-2008 in our present bubble.  This recession is going to be significantly longer, and the recovery substantially slower than previous ones.  Indeed, the “truth about jobs” is that there may be many fewer than before because we are no longer driven by a significant bubble in Southern California (at least in the forseeable future) while the late 1990’s recieved a shot in the arm.

Some thoughts about the current unemployment rate (which is over 10% in California at the present time) and future projections over the next 2 years.

Indeed, remember that in past recessions, unemployment peaked some time after the recession ended, hence the effects of the recession being felt much longer than the recession lasting.  It is important to remember that the end of a recession only signals that the economy has stopped contracting.  It does not mean that there will be a quick return to the heady days of the prosperous times that preceded it.  This time might be much worse, as household balance sheets are still carrying considerable debt with litle savings.  Until those are rectified, it is hard to see any meaningful reignition of economic activity that is not inflation-linked.  And, with joblessness at record levels, any inflation we do see will not be the kind of inflation we saw in the 1970’s, constituting a wage-price spiral.

We’ll touch on that next time when we discuss Myth #2, Housing Prices will jump as soon as unemployment begins to come down.

• Bottom Callers , Denial , Housing Crash , Mean Reversion , Real Estate Myths , SoCal , predictions
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Chuck Ponzi May 31st, 2009

Today I came across a detailed analysis of the mortgage meltdown in California along with detailed graphs, long-term analysis, and an indepth look at where we are in the overall housing bubble.

The T2 Partners paper provided by More Mortgage Meltdown can be downloaded here:

I recommend looking over the entire presentation, as it provides a play by play of where we have come in the last 3 years, and what to expect for the coming 3 years.  I agree with the general assessment that we are in the middle innings of the overall price declines (perhaps in Inning 5 of 9), but the real movement is yet to come in the middle and high-end price tiers.  Of course, there is no way of accounting for significant outside involvement that might change that outcome, however any change must be structural and permanent (such as offering citizenship to anyone purchasing real estate, offering 20% of the purchase price, no questions asked by the government, or total global thermonuclear war.  I doubt many can understand what those outcomes would look like, so we’ll focus on the most likely scenarios.

The key is really what is happening and will continue to happen California. Their assesment, given by Mark Hanson, is in my opinion spot on to how I expect the next 2 years to play out:

California housing — at the low end — is ‘bottoming’ mostly because: a) median prices are down 55% from their peak over the past two years, thereby making the low end affordable; b) foreclosures have temporarily been cut by 66% through moratoriums reducing supply; and c) demand is picking up going into the busy season.
But the moratoriums are ending and the number of foreclosures in the pipeline is massive — they will start showing themselves as REO over the near to mid-term. The Obama plan held the foreclosure wave back, creating a huge backlog and now the servicers are testing hundreds of thousands of defaults against the new loss mitigation initiatives. We presently see the Notice of Defaults at record highs and Notice of Trustee Sales back up to 9 month highs — there is no reason for a loan to go to the Notice of Trustee Sale stage if indeed it wasn’t a foreclosure. However, the new ‘batch’ are not only from the low end but a wide mix all the way up to several million dollars in present value.
Because the majority of buyers are in ultra low and low-mid prices ranges, the supply-demand imbalance from foreclosures and organic supply will crush the mid-to-upper priced properties in 2009. We already have early seasonal hard data proving this. As the mid-to-upper end go through their respective implosions this year and the volume of sales in these bands increase as prices tumble, the mix shift will raise median and average house prices creating the ultimate in false bottoms. We also have data proving this phenomenon.

You can find this narrative (and much more) on slide 62.

• Credit Bubble , Dead Cat Bounce , Foreclosures , Housing Crash , Investing
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Chuck Ponzi May 12th, 2009

For loyal long-time readers, you may remember this one.  It was my very first Happy Birthday Socal post.  And, one of my favorites.

Yes, the SCREBC-famous Pepto Bismol House in San Clemente.

My assertion at the time was that there were several problems in order of increasing stupidity:

1.  Terrible Marketing, pictures, etc.

2.  Terrible Pricing… one year on the market, chasing it down and never being close enough to reality

3.  Terrible Location.  I’ll let the picture speak for itself:

Well, if you wondered what happened… it’s back up for sale.

Yes, a scant nearly 2 1/2 years on the market hasn’t deterred this delusional seller from trying to sell for higher than market prices.  It’s listed today for 649K, probably a full 150K higher than what it would take to move the property.  At least they came down from 875K in December 2006.  If they had been aggressive then, I believe they could easily have gotten 750K to 775K at the time.  Unfortunately, greed got the better of the owner, the listing agent, or both.

The post is a “What Not to Wear” for home listings.  And, remember in September 2007 when the bubble was still a debateable topic?  Yeah, I warned the sellers then that the next year was going to be tough.  It was.

And, it doesn’t seem to be getting any easier.  Keep in mind that one of the properties that I compared it to last time seems to have been foreclosed on and appears to presently be in shadow inventory land.  It (a 2700sq ft sfr built in 2001 with much better curb appeal) appears to have gone back to the bank in January at $568.5K.  That doesn’t bode well for the area.

Besides, I think the realtor must not have changed or learned much in the intervening 2 years about property marketing:

I think she learned to turn the camera on its side this time… projects height.

Luckily, the buyer bought in 2000 for $402K.  They’re almost assured a gain on the house unless they already spent it.  Let’s hope they didn’t.  If this doesn’t sell, it’ll always be shadow inventory, waiting for prices to tick back up.  Unfortunately, there are many better prices in the area this time around.  Even though the listing is now 225K lighter, I’m afraid it’s still in fantasy land.

Thanks and come again to Fantasy Island.

• Delusion , Denial , Housing Crash
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Chuck Ponzi May 6th, 2009

Don’t think it can happen in prime areas?

This Newport Beach residence sold for 2.5M in August 2006.  It’s now for sale for $781,000.

One might consider buying this just to rent it out and sell it later on to a developer.

Contrary to my first thought, it’s not trashed inside:

Better like some traffic noise, though.  It backs to Newport @ Via Lido.  Nice weather, too bad you won’t want to open your windows.

• Housing Crash , Speculation
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Chuck Ponzi March 19th, 2009

This is a great lead-in to what the credit bubble is and how it happened. Delves deep and stays on target.

• Credit Bubble , Deflation , Housing Crash , Mean Reversion
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