|  home  |   My Profile  |   The Forum

Archive for the 'Mean Reversion' Category

Orange County Down 20% in one Year - It’s in the Bag!

Chuck Ponzi April 16th, 2008

Dataquick gives us the skinny on Socal housing median prices:

All homes Mar-07 Mar-08 %Chng Mar-07 Mar-08 %Chng
Los Angeles 8,353    4,263   -49.0%   $540,000   $440,000   -18.50%
Orange 3,130    1,663   -46.9%   $629,000   $506,000   -19.60%
Riverside 3,680    2,691   -26.9%   $420,000   $306,250   -27.10%
San Bernardino 2,476    1,534   -38.0%   $369,000   $265,000   -28.20%
San Diego 3,218    2,108   -34.5%   $490,000   $395,000   -19.40%
Ventura    999       549   -45.0%   $566,750   $430,000   -24.10%
SoCal 21,856   12,808   -41.4%   $505,000   $385,000   -23.80%

I’m sure some can appreciate how this is actually greater than the 17% “in the bag” that Gary Watts promised us in 2006 in reverse. After an already negative appreciation in 07 and depreciation on the way down is the inverse (more $ on the downside than on the upside per percent), prices are easily back to 2005 prices in the median, and 2004 and 2003 pricing for what is actually selling. The crash is continuing.

Repeat - It needs to be said

Chuck Ponzi March 24th, 2008

The following is a copy of a post I made back in November 2005 (nearly 2 1/2 years ago).  Pay close attention to what is supposed to happen next:

from Interest Only - Creative Financing or Harbinger of Deflation?

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

The economists over at Elliott Wave have a great write up about deflation and what causes deflation in a piece titled “What is Deflation and What Causes it to Occur?”

All deflationary periods were marked with the following conditions:
(a) All were set off by a deflation of excess credit. This was the one factor in common.
(b) Sometimes the excess-of-credit situation seemed to last years before the bubble broke.
(c) Some outside event, such as a major failure, brought the thing to a head, but the signs were visible many months, and in some cases years, in advance.
(d) None was ever quite like the last, so that the public was always fooled thereby.
(e) Some panics occurred under great government surpluses of revenue (1837, for instance) and some under great government deficits.
(f) Credit is credit, whether non-self-liquidating or self-liquidating.
(g) Deflation of non-self-liquidating credit usually produces the greater slumps.

From the article: “Self-liquidating credit is a loan that is paid back, with interest, in a moderately short time from production. Production facilitated by the loan - for business start-up or expansion, for example - generates the financial return that makes repayment possible. The full transaction adds value to the economy.”

Credit lent against homes are most definitely non-self-liquidating credit. Unless, you count the opportunity cost of renting as a form of liquidation - however this requires there to be some relationship of rents to monthly payments; something that can’t be said of current market. The relationship of these nonproductive asset backed loans to productive asset backed loans, it would seem is at its peak historically.

Reading this type of semi doom-and-gloom scholarly article makes me think about the many types of financing recently available to the public masses and what impact they might have.

It takes a bit of economic sense to understand a risk premium. A risk premium is an additional amount that a lender expects to compensate them for additional risk. If risk is considered great either a high risk premium is attached or sometimes a transaction cannot take place. We currently have some of the lowest risk premiums in history; interest rates on non-productive assets are at historical lows.

Typically, a lender requires that at some point, principal on the note must be paid back. Interest only loans are an exception to this. Why? And, why have they become popular now?

It’s easy to see why a borrower would want to take on one of these loans; why pay for something now if I can pay later. But, what’s more interesting is why are they so popular for lenders?

Human beings are a fickle bunch. Each one wanting to do something different than the other. Like watching an ant, it runs to and fro, sometimes lost, sometimes productive, but always unpredictable. But, take a step back, and the anthill is an extremely efficient, coordinated jumble of activity. A very predictable bunch. Human financial systems are similar. Each borrower is very unpredictable, but bundle a few thousand together and they suddenly become more predictable; hence the popularity of Mortgage Backed Security Bonds (MBS’s).

BUT… and you knew this was coming… you need to take even a step back to see what is going on in the macro environment. Who has all of this money, and why are they lending it at such low rates. A flat yield curve would signal that lenders see little reason require a larger risk premium for longer-term loans because they expect long-term rates to be about where they are far into the future. How often is the bond market right? Well, that’s for you to decide. Greenspan has even named it a conundrum.

So, this brings me to the title of my post. How could interest only loans signal possible deflation in the future? We already know that low-interest rates can be a signal, but what about creative financing?

Interest only loans cannot be self-liquidating in the short run. When they switch to a liquidating (fully amortized) loan, the payments jump substantially because they do 2 things at once: 1, they begin fully amortizing 2, they adjust to prevailing interest rates. One would expect that people faced with these issues would simply replace the shorter amortizing period with a longer amortizing period at the same rate. Or, they would attempt to liquidate the loan by selling. Since interest-only loans are not self-liquidating in the short run, the bond market is signalling that for the medium-term, interest rates and returns will be low, or that investors are extremely risk-averse to the stock market. The investors feel justified that any possible deflation is offset by the Fed’s moderate inflationary policy, or at least an attempt to prevent deflation. So, MBS investors have signalled that for the medium term (3 to 10 years), that they would rather take their chances with low interest rates AND non-liquidating debt.

Will this truly end as Greenspan has put it? I will leave you with one of his most famous statements on the subject:
But what they perceive as newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear. Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that supported higher prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low risk premiums.

Video of the Day

Chuck Ponzi February 26th, 2008

Sometimes it just tickles the funny bone.

And, a flashback is always great. Someday, we will see this as an example of how wrong people too close to it can call it:

So Subprime Blows Up; So What, Says Cramer

Welcome 2008, SCREBC Blog Style

Chuck Ponzi January 16th, 2008

Last year, my predictions for 2007 Southern California Housing turned out to be of all things, too optimistic. Let’s take a quick peak back at my predictions with respect to the most recent Dataquick information.

1. The bubble will or will not burst depending on your definition:

Predictions:

Sales Price: Down 5-7% correction

Sales Volume: Down 10 to 20%

Actuals:

Sales price: Down 13.3%

Sales Volume: Down 45.3%

Comments:

I whiffed this one. I believed strongly that we could encounter a credit event at some point in 2007, but as all events are, they are hard to anticipate exactly how swift they will start or end especially a year in advance. I was way too optimistic in 2007, though not nearly as optimistic as Gary Watts who predicted a 7% increase in prices.

I think that no matter whose definition you are using, the bubble burst in 2007. Only Gary Watts can’t see it, and he’s got to be the only person in the entire world who cannot see it.

2. The Subprime Mortgage market will shrink considerably.

Volume Prediction: Down 40%

Volume Actual: It has been difficult to find a reliable source that can be quoted, as even the MBIA doesn’t have a grasp on what happened in 2007 yet, it is safe to say that subprime was likely much more than 40% off from 2006. Many of the major subprime companies went Tango Uniform this year, while those that (somewhat) survived have been castrated (Countrywide total volume was halved, subprime near nonexistence)

Comments:

This again was unpredictable due to the sheer volume and speed of failures of subprime lenders. It is very likely that subprime will contract back to its 2001 or 2000 originations volume, which is about a 95% retracement. Reversion to the mean.

3. Gary Watts will not realize how bad he is at predicting things, and he will still make a lot of money this year.

Comments:

This is a no brainer. Gary Watts is quite possibly the worst predictor of housing in Southern California. Even the most hardened and staunch supporters were asking questions at the beginning of 2007. If you were completely surprised by last year, I suggest you stop covering your ears and eyes.

Still, I’d like an opportunity to offer as many workshops as he does. He knows no more about the local real estate economy than my 4 year old, and yet he’s highly paid for his “work”. So much for reporting integrity if he’s just doing it for the money. If he really believes it, I have to wonder how he’s able to dress himself in the morning. Normally that kind of mental retardation imposes some pretty stiff limitations on your ability to care for yourself.

4. We will have asset deflation with stable (high) CPI inflation.

Lead story on Yahoo finance today was titled: “Inflation Rate is Worst in 17 Years“. Housing prices are plummetting in almost every locale.  Nuff said.

5. I will be spending more time on posts

I did… I really did. Sometimes it seems like I take long breaks between, but it’s because I hold down a regular job, run an internet business on the side, am involved in community and church affairs, and I have a wife and 2 young children.

I will be following up shortly with the belated 2008 predictions. Suffice to say, it’s not going to be positive. We won’t be seeing a bottom in 2008, much less a rebound.

Peter Schiff - Rockstar of the Housing Bubble

Chuck Ponzi October 28th, 2007

I have to admit, one of my guilty pleasures is both listening to Peter Schiff and following his advice. His theories have given my portfolio a great push forward. This is a great example of taking on the domestic bull in relationship to our declining dollar. There will be a time to buy USD again, but that time is not now.

I believe a lot of that timing will come from Bernanke’s will to crush the housing bubble. If he doesn’t, it’ll be a long time before we can get well again. We need to take the tough medicine.

Orange Crush: From the Frontlines

Chuck Ponzi October 26th, 2007

Jonathan Lansner reported on the most recent moves in median sales prices:

Early October home-selling stats from DataQuick show the credit crunch’s grip on the market. Difficulties getting mortgages meant sales activity was down 41% vs. a year ago for the 22 business days ended Oct. 12. If that holds, it’ll mean that O.C.’s losing streak will hit 25 straight months where the buying pace failed to meet last year’s activity levels.

Pricing was also weak. The overall median selling price, down 8.8% in a year, held at the 31-month low ($570,000) hit last month.

It appears that median prices are beginning to show the overall trend in pricing. This could mean one of 2 things:

1. Lower end is recovering

2. Higher End is also feeling pressure now.

Originally, I forecase a median price down year over year for 2007 to be in the 3 to 5% down range. That may prove to be too optimistic, and reality further from that.

Consider what is now typical pricing:

23 Nopalitos

23 Nopalitos Way, Aliso Viejo

1923 Sq Ft 4-bd, 2.5bth. Gated Community. Recent foreclosure. Landscaping dead, dead, dead.

List Price: $604,900

Last Purchase Price: $740,000

Last Purchase Date: 9/13/2006.

Loss in Last 13 months if asking price is met: $135,100 (18.3%) (23% after commissions)

Zestimate: $756K (Can you say disconnected?)

These houses sold 5 years ago in the 300K range. I wouldn’t be surprised to see mid 400’s, if not low 400’s.

So, isn’t the 8.8% reduction in median price still skewed a bit high? Yes. On upswings, it understates the increase, and on downswings, it understates the decrease. It’s more of a lagging indicator.

Enjoy your weekend

Chuck Ponzi Law of Unintended Consequences II

Chuck Ponzi October 8th, 2007

Some longer time readers will remember a post that I made back in April of this year titled “Chuck Ponzi’s Law of Unintended Consequences“.  That post detailed the bail-out idea du jour… foreclosure moratoriums.

I always enjoy a discussion of how the mortgage mess that we find ourselves in can be “fixed” by using nontraditional methods.  For each of the parties arguing the solution, it often involves directly benefitting them, while the cost is to be borne by another group… “the marks”.

Mike Shedlock’s analysis of the CRL (Center for Responsible Lending) and FDIC’s proposed solutions is particluarly interesting.  His post is properly titled “The Debt Slave Act of 2005 Revisted“, which makes perfect sense considering how consumers have effectively been cut off from the one chance to make a clean break after devastating financial problems.  Instead, the newer law attempts to weed out deadbeat habitual spendthrifts from performing frequent and repeated filings to wipe the board clean every few years.  Instead, it has made it difficult enough to file bankruptcy that there is little to no possible way out.  In addition, with pledges to repay, many become debt slaves to past problems, unable to leave them in the past.

Don’t get me wrong, I’m definitely for personal responsibility in life, perhaps even too much; but the law as it currently stands puts a burden on already destitute people.  It has served to benefit lenders most of all.  So, it is with some twisted satisfaction that I read what Mish has to say on the matter… all of with which I agree.

First, he quotes a CNN Money article (shortened excerpt)

One consumer group estimates that 600,000 foreclosures could be avoided over the next two years by making a simple change to the bankruptcy code.

The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) calls it a tweak, but it could be a significant change for homeowners and the market for mortgage-backed securities.
CRL’s proposal - reflected in a House bill recently introduced - would make changes to the regulations for Chapter 13 bankruptcies, which don’t wipe out debts, but rather establish a repayment plan.

Under current law, when a person files for Ch. 13 bankruptcy, judges cannot reduce mortgage debt owed on a person’s primary residence, although they may modify mortgages on investment property or second homes.

Under the House bill, the bankruptcy judge would have the option of reducing what the homeowner owes the lender. Say a homeowner’s property is worth less than what he owes. The judge could reduce the principal to match the home’s current market value as well as reduce the loan’s interest rate.

Mish also quotes the FDIC’s proposal:

The heat on U.S. mortgage lenders and servicers was turned up a few degrees this week when the country’s chief bank regulator publicly proposed that they permanently freeze interest rates on subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) for many homeowners.

“Keep it at the starter rate. Convert it into a fixed rate. Make it permanent. And get on with it,” Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair said in prepared remarks at an investor’s conference.

That solution is nearly as bizarre.

Now, before too many of my readers go off on rants considering how this is supremely unfair… consider 2 things:  first, if balances on loans can be decided in a court and lowered as a judge feels inclined, how many banks will want to loan money, and secondly consider what Mish has to say regarding “fixing” the ARMs:

It should not take a genius to figure out that if ARMs rates are “frozen” at a point where the market does not think rates should be, there simply will be no more ARMs offered. Furthermore, to cover the cost of existing ARMS, prices would rise on new fixed rate mortgages. Oddly enough, price fixing ARMs would not even help the person most at risk because that person cannot afford the teaser rate, let alone the cost of a current ARMS rate. Thus price fixing ARMs is a sure fired guaranteed way to cause a continued weakness in home prices, if not an actual out and out crash.

Which reminds me of the original Chuck Ponzi Law of Unintended Consequences:

If there is any chance that someone can get bailed out by someone else, they will, and you will have to pay for it from your own pocket.

Now, I’m considering that I have to add that while you may need to pay for it, anything other than letting the market deal with it efficiently will likely crash it anyway.  In the end, it is the same thing that my first Econ professor in college always said was the #1 rule of economics:  TNSTAAFL “There’s No Such Thing As A Free Lunch”.  No such thing.

I am willing to bet that any artificial means of attempting to “solve” the problem will only make it worse, both for the person they are trying to help, and the overall group of people.  The only people helped by the above solutions are those who have ALL of the following:

  1. Long histories of repayment
  2. Excellent credit scores
  3. Lots of cash for a down payment, maybe up to 30 or 40% to prevent bankruptcy write-downs
  4. Enough income to support purchases on fixed rates with lengthy work history.

This way, only the most qualified can purchase.  At current prices, there are likely only 1 to 2% of the people in the entire Southern California region who could fit this bill for an average home.  And, frankly, there is no way these people will live in an “average” SoCal home.  Imposing the suggested “solutions” will only serve to do three things:

  • Depeen the credit crunch
  • Crash the housing market
  • induce a consumer-led recession, if not depression

The deeper the credit crunch, the harder and farther housing prices will have to fall to meet demand.  The harder and further prices fall, the more likely that good paying homeowners will walk away from an underwater mortgage.  More foreclosures dropping prices and deeper credit crunch will turn off MEW (Mortgage Equity Withdrawals) which is what has been keeping the consumer (along with their credit cards) in clothes, vacations, and Plasma TV’s.  A crumbled consumer is a crumbled economy.

When the service on debt becomes more than the income, defaults are certain.  Since US wages have been in real decline (against inflation), and the US dollar in severe decline, the loss of purchasing power has become an unbelievable crush.  Anyone who has not felt and seen the substantial inflation over the past 2 years has either been asleep or dead.  Even high-end wage earners have felt the sting of higher prices.

All of this leaves me very pessimistic about the local economy that has been so built on the fortunes of real estate.  I fear we may have much, much worse things ahead of us compared with the past few months.

“Now is the Time to Hunt for Housing Bargains”

Chuck Ponzi August 9th, 2007

This was the headline of some financial reasearch issued by Joseph Hargett of Schaeffer Research on March 27th, 2007.

I’ll let you decide how prudent that advice was by viewing the top homebuilders’ stocks from that date until today measured against the S&P 500.

Homebuilders Stocks

I’m predicting that even with all of the price declines, I believe there’s still a lot more.

Here is what Joseph had to say:

It seems you can’t talk about the housing sector these days without mentioning the “S” word. Subprime, yes I said it, has even wormed its way into the vernacular of many Fed watchers and Fed members - not to mention the warning shots fired from the sidelines by former Federal Reserve chief Alan Greenspan every other week or so. This morning, the Fed sounded yet another gloom and doom note for the housing sector, as Sandra Braunstein, the director of the Fed’s division of consumer and community affairs, stated that borrowers could see “more difficulty” in the next one to two years. In particular, those borrowers with recently originated adjustable-rate mortgages are likely to experience more delinquencies and foreclosures, Braunstein said.

and

Admittedly, the situation is not very flattering for the U.S. housing market. However, I think that the hype over the popping of the so called “housing bubble” is being overplayed just a bit too much. Just take this quote from a March 18 New York Times article titled “On the Homefront”: “In many quarters, Greenspan was essentially accused of cheating the country out of the depression we deserved: instead of allowing the swooning Nasdaq to bring down the United States economy and punish us for our sins, he had rolled the tech bubble into a housing bubble and allowed the party to go on.”

Blaming Greenspan seems convenient at this point, especially with Bernanke’s Fed in a holding pattern. And comparing the “Dot-com” bust to the current situation in housing seems rather irresponsible. After all, betting on virtual real estate seems a far cry from betting on housing prices and “real” real estate. I mean, can you really compare the long defunct Pets.com and WebVan to Lennar ( LEN: View sentiment for LENsentiment, chart, options) and Hovnanian (HOV: View sentiment for HOVsentiment, chart, options) ?

I have sat on this article for 5 months to see if my research was right on where they were headed… in an effort to dispel any myths. He was dead wrong, and worse than that, revealed poor research on the underlying fundamentals of the housing problem. It is and still is an affordability crisis. The decline in sales will not abate until that affordability standard is reachieved. At current course and speed, that won’t be for another 2 years at the minimum.

I believe that we will still see some of these builders declare bankruptcy (ch 11) before this bust is through.

Not So Many Courters After All

Chuck Ponzi May 3rd, 2007

OK, the jokes can now officially begin.

New Century is now Old Century and some such garbage.

New Century announced that 2000. Yes, 2000 employees will be severed tomorrow (no, not their limbs, just their jobs).

From Forbes:

Financially strapped subprime mortgage lender New Century Financial Corp., failed to receive any bids for its mortgage loan origination business, forcing it to shut down the unit and lay off around 2,000 employees, the company told employees Thursday.

The Irvine-based company, which has been preparing to sell off its assets under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection since last month, notified employees during a conference call that they would be laid off effective Friday.

Speaking on the call, New Century President and Chief Executive Brad A. Morrice said despite a number of potential buyers for its wholesale and consumer-direct operations, “none of those potential deals have come to pass.”

Just who those original “suitors” were remains a mystery to the outsiders. I remember clearly the day that it was announced that 6 companies had thrown their hats into the ring. I guess there was a realization that little to no value remained in that portion of the business. Of course, not all is lost, the servicing arm has already lined up buyers.

It’s good to take a look back at how hopeful that really was. Irrational Exuberance?

Interestingly, last night, my wife made me watch American Idol. One of the departing contestants (I don’t know or remember who) sang the Bon Jovi hit “Blaze of Glory”.

Therefore, I dedicate this video to New Century:

No I aint looking for forgiveness
But before I’m six foot deep
Lord, I got to ask a favor
And I’ll hope you’ll understand
cause Ive lived life to the fullest
Let the boy die like a man
Staring down the bullet
Let me make my final stand

“Warm and Has Pulse”

Chuck Ponzi April 20th, 2007

DR Horton is doing what I have predicted builders would do:  offset falling housing prices by building more, not less (as housing bulls suggested).  Their reported earnings fell 85%.  Not much of a surprise.

Here comes the best quote, related to DR Horton’s cancellation policy:

Unlike other home builders, Horton said it has no plans to weed out potential buyers who may not be able to qualify for a loan in order to bring down the cancellation rate.

“As I’ve said to all our salespeople, if a buyer is warm and has a pulse, we want to put them on paper,” he said.

You could tell the whole story in that single phrase.

Next »